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EDITOR’S NOTE
It is with great pride that I announce the second issue of The Forum.
When D r. Trice first invited Katrina Chludzinski and me to partake in
this project in 2008, we had bold dreams for what we wanted this
journal to become. Two years later, I am happy to say that many of
them have been realized.
From the beginning, we wanted this journal to welcome a range of
perspectives. Titling our journal The Forum, therefore, was no
accident—it stemmed from our hope that this journal would provide
an outlet for student work irrespective of an author’s major, level of
study, or institutional affiliation. With this issue, we have come closer
to fully actualizing that goal. While most of this issue’s papers were
written by Cal Poly students, we received submissions from students at
four different universities and are pleased to include a paper from a
recent graduate of UC Berkeley. The Forum hopes to welcome students
from many other universities in the future.
Katrina and I also wanted this journal to become widely available.
Thanks to the help of Cal Poly librarian Marisa R amirez, The Forum is
now available electronically via the Cal Poly Digital Commons. This
resource is undoubtedly a valuable means for our contributors to share
their work with family, friends, and the academic community.
As both Katrina and I graduate this year, this issue marks a turning
point for The Forum. Though saddened to leave this project behind, we
depart knowing that next year’s executive editors will continue to help
this journal grow. The Forum has come a long way in the past two years
and we are eager to see where future editors will lead it. Although it is
young , The Forum is an important project that not only serves as a
necessary outlet for student work, but also epitomizes Cal Poly’s “learn
by doing” philosophy and encapsulates the goals of Phi Alpha Theta to
promote the study of history and foster intellectual exchange—I hope
that it will continue to do so for many years to come.
Keith Goodwin
Co-Executive Editor
vii
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ARTICLE SUMMARIES
A “ Velvet Prison” with Chinese Characteristics: The Construction
of Culture in Post-1989 China | Keith Goodwin
On June 4, 1989, the Tiananmen Square protests transformed
Beijing into a virtual war zone. To many in the We st, it seemed
that China was on the verge of a dramatic revolution that would
see the collapse of communism and the emergence of a democratic
China. While there have been many changes in China since 1989,
Goodwin argues that post-1989 China has been most visibly
defined by a profound tension between the Chinese Communist
Party’s attempts to foster dramatic economic development and
modernization and its desire to avoid challenges to its traditional
authority. Building upon Miklós Haraszti’s The Velvet Prison:
Artists Under State Socialism, Goodwin argues that the state no
longer possesses a monopoly on culture in post-1989 China.
Although the state has been successful in reinventing its
hegemonic structure and has continued to maintain a large degree
of control, Goodwin contends that individuals, groups, and the
forces of the market economy have also gained an enormous degree
of influence in the construction of culture, and have frequently
challenged, if not undermined, the Chinese government’s
traditional authority.
The Housewife’s Battle on the Home Front: Women in World War
II Advertisements | Caroline Cornell
In this article, Caroline Cornell analyzes the ways in which
American women were portrayed in American media and war
advertisements during World War II. As American men left to
fight overseas, numerous jobs became vacant, including important
factory jobs that were essential to military success. Although many
women rose to the task of filling these vacancies, a large portion of
women aided the war effort from home. Housewives played a
substantial role in the success of wartime rationing and salvaging
efforts, the campaign for victory gardens, and the purchasing of
xi

war bonds. While images such as “Rosie the Riveter” predominate
contemporary perceptions of the role of women in the war effort,
Cornell argues that advertisements during the period suggest that
the housewife was crucially important and well respected during
the period, especially as the war started to end.
“The China Lobby”: Influences on U.S.-China Foreign Policy in
the Postwar Period, 1949-1954 | Jeff Blackwell
The “China Lobby” was a broad network of people, both foreign
and domestic, whose interests coalesced around the goal of
overthrowing communism in China following the rise of Mao
Zedong. Aided by the anticommunist political environment of
1950s America, the Lobby’s loose affiliation of influential
individuals—which included well-financed National Chinese
officials, right-wing American political elites, and key associates in
the private sector and media—exerted considerable pressure on
U.S. foreign policy decisions concerning China. Focusing on the
period 1949-1954, Blackwell argues that the China Lobby’s use of
political lobbying, sympathetic media outlets, and attacks on critics
of pro-Nationalist policy allowed it to effectively promote a proChiang Kai-shek foreign policy.
Seeing Pennsylvania as the Keystone of the Revolution: Charles H.
Lincoln’s Treatment of Ethnicity | Greg Rogers
Greg Rogers analyzes Charles H. Lincoln’s The Revolutionary
Movement in Pennsylvania, 1760-1776, a significant work in the
historiography of the American Revolution. According to Rogers,
the concept of ethnicity, or “race,” permeates Lincoln’s 1901 book.
Rogers notes, for example, that the development of the American
Revolution in Pennsylvania is depicted as being an ethnic struggle
in which competing blocs of English Quakers, Scotch-Irish, and
Germans struggle for political control amongst themselves as well
as the British metropole. In this sense, Lincoln’s history marks the
first example of the “dual-revolution thesis” later made famous by
xii

Carl Becke r. After analyzing the content, historical context, and
subject matter of the monograph, Rogers argues that Lincoln’s
view of ethnicity and its importance in his work can be attributed
not only to the monograph’s focus on Pennsylvania, but also to
influences of the Progressive Era and its historiographical
approach. Whether or not Pennsylvania and Progressive-Era
thinking produced a skewed or inaccurate account of the
American Revolution is open to debate. What is certain, Rogers
concludes, is that factors of contemporary time and provincial
place are just as evident in Lincoln’s text as the broader thesis he
pioneers.
Reading Between the Laws: Literary Representations of the French
Homosexual, 1942-1981 | Alison Veith
It was not until the turn of the twentieth century that the word
“homosexual” began to define a person or state of being. Before
appearing in medical discourse and the psychoanalytic work of
individuals like Sigmund Freud, the word was associated with a
sexual act, not as significant aspect of one’s identity. Considering
this lexical transition and the beginning of homosexual identity
articulations in France, Alison Veith explores the ways that the
French homosexual male defined himself, how historical, social,
and ideological factors influenced that self-definition, and, finally,
asks what comparisons might be made between the French
homosexual and his American counterpart. Focusing specifically
on the period 1942-1981—a period in which anti-gay legislation
directly imposed a guise of discretion and invisibility on the
developing “gay community”—Veith draws on writings by both
French and American homosexual men in Paris, not only in order
to compare their national and cultural perspective, but to better
understand their sense of personal identity, personal sexuality, and
personal nationality.

xiii

An America that Could Be: Emma Goldman, Anarchism, and the
“American Dream” | Christina Samons
The so-called “Gilded Age,” 1865-1901, was a period in American
history characterized by great progress, but also of great turmoil as
the United States underwent social, economic, and political
transformations. Out of this period emerged Emma Goldman,
who, responding to the transformations of the Gilded Age, became
a well-known critic of both governmental and non-governmental
institutions and a controversial advocate of anarchism in the early
twentieth century. In this article, Christina Samons analyzes
primary sources written by Goldman in order to explain the salient
features of her anarchist theory. In doing so, she attempts to
reconcile Goldman’s insistence on a return to the ideals set forth
during the American Revolution with the historical environment
in which Emma Goldman wrote. In Goldman’s opinion, Samons
argues, American society had drifted away from the ideal of the
“American Dream” due to the institutionalization of exploitation
within all aspects of social and political life: namely economics,
religion, and the law.
In Defense of Southern Honor: Preston Brooks and the Attack on
Charles Sumner | Daniel Lawrence Slusser
On May 22, 1856, South Carolina Congressman Preston Brooks
approached the desk of Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumne r.
Declaring Sumner’s recent speech to be a “libel on South
Carolina,” Brooks proceeded to brutally attack Sumner with his
cane. Looking back on this incident, Daniel Lawrence Slusser
examines the personal and political circumstances leading up to
the attack on Sumner as well as the cultural forces that shaped
Preston Brooks’s personal psycholog y. Ultimately, Slusser argues,
Brooks’s attack on Sumner was representative of culture in the
antebellum South and its fixation on the cause of honor—a
mentality that would also be influential in the build-up to the Civil
Wa r.
xiv
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A “VELVET PRISON” WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS:
THE CONSTRUCTION OF CULTURE IN POST-1989 CHINA
By Keith Goodwin
On June 5, 1989, an unidentified man stood alone in front of a row of
Chinese tanks. The image, captured by a number of photographers at
the scene, was soon scattered throughout Western news reports, which
emphasized the power of the individual to stand up to the brute force
of an oppressive state—a modern version of David and Goliath. The
scene unfolded the day after the Chinese government sent the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) into Beijing to disperse civilians who had been
protesting in and around Tiananmen Square for weeks. Following a
previous failure to disperse the protesters in May, the Chinese govern
ment deployed the PLA with live rounds and tanks and ordered that
the soldiers clear the square by dawn of June 4.1 What ensued was
chaos. Beijing was transformed into a virtual war zone with the PLA
1
“The Tank Man,” dire cted by Antony Thomas, Frontline, PBS, April 11, 2006.
Available online at http ://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tankman/ (accessed Nov
ember 7, 2009).
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openly firing upon civilians, wounding 7,000 and killing as many as
2,600 people.2
Western democratic nations have often viewed the events that
unfolded in 1989 as the brutal suppression of a democratic uprising
against authoritarian-communist rule. Emphasizing images like the
Goddess of Democracy and placing June 4 in the context of revolutions
that occurred in the Eastern Bloc around the same time, however, tends
to obscure the fact that the protesters in Beijing sought reform, not
revolution.3
In the twenty years since June 4, 1989, China has undergone a
dramatic economic revolution and transformed itself beyond many
people’s wildest expectations. While it is tempting to see China’s post
1989 economic development and the diminishing visibility of the state
as a micromanaging entity as a response to the events in Tiananmen
Square, it is important to recognize that many of the trends that have
surfaced in the past two decades were in motion prior to the 1989 pro
tests. Since taking control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in
1978, Deng Xiaoping had begun a process of “Reform and Opening”
that was designed to bring about economic development and material
prosperity without sacrificing the political status quo.4 Nonetheless,
Deng’s economic reforms—often characterized as “Socialism with Chi
nese Characteristics”—allowed an increasing degree of cultural
freedom, particularly after his 1992 “Southern Tour.” Thus, June 4 is
best viewed not as a transformative event in the modernization of
China, but as a consequence of tensions inherent in a policy that sought
dramatic economic development without the chaos of Mao’s Cultural
Revolution or a challenge to traditional party authority. This tension
continues today.
2
“The Tank Man”; Nicholas D. Kristof, “Beijing Death Toll at Least 300; Army
Tightens Control of City but Angry Resistance Goes On,” The New York Times, June 5,
1989.
3
Jeffre y N. Wasserstrom, “Tiananmen’s Shifting Legacy,” in China in 2008: A Year
of Great Significance, ed. Kate Merkel-Hess, Kenneth L. Pomeranz, and Jeffrey N.
Wasserstrom, 135-140 (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009), 135.
4
Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 2004), 1.
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This essay aims to analyze the construction of “Chinese” culture
since 1989. Although the events of June 4 will be important to this
endeavor, this essay does not intend to illustrate the specific contribu
tions of the Tiananmen Square protests to China’s post-1989 cultural
development. Instead, this essay looks at the “delicate dance” that has
occurred in the last two decades of Chinese history as traditional party
rhetoric and government influence have confronted an increasingly
pluralistic cultural environment. This is not to say that the previous
twenty years have been marked by a simple state-versus-individual
conflict. On the contrary, the construction of culture and national
identity in post-1989 China has been highly complex and has been the
consequence of conflict and interaction between the state, society, and
the market economy.
Certainly the hegemonic influence of the state has played a signifi
cant role in defining the limits of the interactions and discourses during
this period, but just as the state has sought to impose a coherent cultural
identity on members of the Chinese community, groups, individuals,
and market forces have similarly affected the development of the state.
By examining various trends since 1989, I hope illuminate the ways in
which this fluid, and often reciprocal, process of cultural construction
has been manifested and demonstrate how it has often undermined the
state’s dominance in the realm of culture.
CHINA’S “VE LVET PRISON”:
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF STATE HEGEMONY
Although I ultimately argue that the state does not possess a monopoly
on culture in post-1989 China, this is not to say that the Chinese gov
ernment is no longer a dominant player in the process of cultural
construction. In fact, the hegemonic power of the state has simply
evolved into a more subtle form since 1989. Geremie Barmé’s In the
Red : On Contemporary Chinese Culture provides a useful line of analysis
for understanding this process by applying the work of Hungarian
writer Miklós Haraszti—author of The Velvet Prison: Artists Under
State Socialism—to contemporary China. Like post-Stalin Eastern
Europe, Barmé argues, the state in post-Mao China has tried to
3
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reformulate the social contract such that “consensus replaces coercion
and complicity subverts criticism.”5 In other words, the state has tried
to co-opt individuals into a “progressive censorship” that effectively
makes them a part of the state rather than a voice of opposition.
While The Velvet Prison focuses specifically on artists, it is equally
useful to an understanding of the evolution of society and culture in
contemporary China. According to Haraszti, “the velvet prison” is a
world in which “[state meddling in the arts] is no longer used to silence
opposition to the state but to ensure that intellectuals will more effec
tively perform their proper role.”6 Consequently, “heavy-handed
methods of the past are pressed into service only when the new ones fail
to function properly.”7 China’s velvet prison thus seems to have its ori
gins in the reforms undertaken following Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power
in 1978. However, as Barmé has noted, Chinese cultural policies in the
1980s were still characterized by a tension between “hard” and “soft”
power approaches, as artists and individuals were co-opted into state
tutelage but were purged—or even violently repressed—when they
stepped outside of tacit boundaries.8 While Haraszti acknowledges that
this alternation of hard and soft power existed in Eastern Europe,
China’s hard power continues to manifest itself—albeit in more minor
forms—well into the post-Mao period. Chinese society has not been
fully coerced into progressive censorship.
China’s velvet prison does not, therefore, fully conform to
Haraszti’s model. The events of June 4 and, more recently, the govern
ment crackdown against Falun Gong, serve as important reminders that
the state has not fully exchanged “sticks” for “carrots.” Generally speak
ing , however, the past twenty years of Chinese history have not been
characterized by the widespread use of brute force to keep the masses in
orde r. In fact, the state has, in many cases, succeeded in co-opting
5
Geremie R. Barmé, In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1999), 7.
6
Miklós Haraszti, The Velvet Prison: Artists Under State Socialism, trans. Katalin
and Stephen Landesmann (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 7.
7
Ibid.
8
Barmé, In the Red, 8-9.
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individual desires by “offering responsibility and a constructive role to
those people of quality hungry for power.”9
Where China also differs from the model described by Haraszti is
in the presence of a market economy. Like the “directed culture” of
state socialism, a market economy also creates limitations:
[An employee’s] human rights are severely circumscribed—
except, of course, his right to work. He cannot go outside the
walls, he cannot wander at will around the factory, cannot say,
or write, or organize whatever he wants. In these matters, it is
the firm’s interests, conveyed by its owners and managers, that
determine right and wrong within the corporate culture…
How is this (admittedly simplified) state of affairs different
from state socialism? Only one aspect is truly different: the
existence of other companies.10
With China’s reforms and the growth of private corporations subject to
market forces and demand, Chinese society is now subject to both the
impositions of state ideolog y and the ideolog y of commerce—a tension
made more dynamic by the state’s influence in the market economy.
Because of this relationship, state hegemony in post-1989 China might
best be conceptualized as a “velvet prison with Chinese characteristics.”
Directed Culture: Patriotic Education and National Humiliation
Although having origins prior to 1989, the structure of China’s velvet
prison was greatly shaped by the Tiananmen Square protests. Respond
ing to the “June 4 Incident,” the CCP undertook a campaign of
“cultural rectification.” The chaos of June 4 and the events that had
unfolded in Eastern Europe throughout 1989 led the Party to conclude
that the abandonment of Mao’s legacy “was nothing less than political
suicide.”11 Hence, “to renew official ideolog y and build broad-based
national support for the Communist regime” became a central concern
9

Haraszti, 26.
Ibid., 65-66. Parentheses orig inal.
11
Liu, 55.
10
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for the state in the aftermath of Tiananmen.12 Within the Party, how
ever, there was disagreement over how to best reformulate and reassert
its ideological influence. On one hand, “conservatives” saw the events of
1989 as a confirmation of their belief that unchecked intellectual
liberalization would undermine government authority.13 They sup
ported a Neo-Maoist ideolog y that criticized Deng Xiaoping’s market
reforms.
Unwilling to sacrifice the goal of economic prosperity, the Party’s
“reformist” wing aimed to develop a new, cohesive ideolog y to unify the
Chinese populace.14 What resulted was an ideolog y that, while not al
ways consistent with the “revolutionary hegemony” that had long
formed the backbone of the state, “retained the discursive formations,
the formal and rhetorical features, of Mao’s ideolog y,” and wrapped the
Party in the cloak of nationalism.15 Such an evolution resembles Karl
Marx’s argument in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
According to Marx, the present was continually infused with the
traditions of history. Even revolutionaries, he claimed, attempted to
glorify their aims in the language of previous generations. Likewise, the
transformation of state hegemony in post-1989 China acted to “conjure
up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names,
battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world
history.”16
Epitomizing the government response to the ideological decay of
the 1980s—particularly the political unrest of June 4, 1989—was a
state-led campaign of “patriotic education.” However, rather than as
sume the form of overt indoctrination, the campaign to instill Chinese
patriotism subtly institutionalized state ideolog y. This is evidenced by
the fact that the educational reforms of the 1990s no longer made the
12
Suisheng Zhao, “A State-Le d Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in
Post-Tiananmen China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, no. 3 (1998): 289.
13
Kalpana Misra, “Curing the Sickness and Saving the Party: Neo-Maoism and
Neo-Conservatism in the 1990s,” in Chinese Political Culture 1989-2000, ed. Shiping
Hua, 133-160 (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 134.
14
Ibid.
15
Liu, 55; Zhao, 289.
16
Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: Interna
tional Publishers, 1963), 15-16.
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Marxist political science exam a requirement for all college applicants in
China. Instead, the state initiated programs like the “I am Chinese”
program in universities and a curriculum in all schools that would “por
tray the Communist state as the embodiment of the nation’s will” and
“reassert the moral authority of the party.”17
It would be a mistake, however, to say that the patriotic education
campaign was purely institutional. R ather, it was a national project that
sought to move beyond the “empty slogans” of previous decades and
foster a general sense of patriotism that identified the Chinese state
with the CC P. 18 In fact, the campaign epitomized 1990s government
propaganda in the sense that reforms that were not strictly consistent
with Maoist dogma nonetheless sought legitimacy via appeals to Maoist
rhetoric. By doing so, the state was able to garner support from those
for whom Maoism was a fundamental historical legacy and incorporate
those who, while born into the system, lacked such concrete experience.
That the 1990s was also a decade in which the state undertook a dra
matic reinvention and restaging of the revolutionary “Red Classics”
attests to the fact that the patriotic education campaign was part of a
larger movement to rectify a mass culture in support of the CC P. 19
The reconstruction of state hegemony under the umbrella of patri
otism also found much success by drawing upon the narrative of
“national humiliation.” Prevalent throughout the history of post-Qing
China, the discourse of national humiliation “recounts how at the
hands of foreign invaders and corrupt Chinese regimes, sovereignty was
lost, territory dismembered, and the Chinese people thus humiliated.”20
State portrayals of the events of June 4 were frequently framed by this
discourse. Liu Baiyu, a senior party novelist, for example, described the
political unrest as a consequence of the “wholesale adoption of Western
bourgeois values.”21 Through this rhetoric, the state not only under
17

Zhao, 291-293.
Ibid., 298-299.
19
Liu, 92-93.
20
William A. Callahan, “History, Identity, and Se curity: Producing and Consum
ing Nationalism in China,” Critical Asian Studies 38, no. 2 (2006): 180.
21
Article appearing in People’s Daily, July 8, 1989, translated and quoted in Barmé,
In the Red, 21.
18
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mined charges that posited inherent flaws in the existing governmental
structure, but also legitimized itself by using a language that had, by all
means, become enmeshed in Chinese culture. In fact, through much of
the twentieth century, the discourse of national humiliation had been
used to construct a China that needed “saving” and to legitimize rule
under Mao and the CC P. 22 As Barmé has observed, “While Deng is
admired for what he has done for the economy, Mao is revered, among
other things, for keeping the superpowers, the United States and Soviet
Union, at bay.”23
National humiliation discourse underwent a revival in the 1990s
and formed an integral component to the state-led campaign to redirect
domestic energies toward a CCP-legitimizing patriotism. This is not
only evidenced by the patriotic education campaign’s emphasis on the
study of Chinese history—especially its modern history of imperial
invasion—and its incompatibility with Western democratic ideals, but
also by the reemergence of textbooks linking political unrest to national
humiliation.24 For example, one government textbook read, “ Today we
are confronted with foreign and domestic enemies who are plotting to
force ‘peaceful evolution’ on our country.”25 These new textbooks were
the first of their kind to appear in China since 1947 and were comple
mented by an array of publications throughout the 1990s that
continually invoked national humiliation.26 By 2001, the discourse of
national humiliation would be institutionalized by the state-declared
“National Defense Education Day,” which, unlike the previous dis
course of national humiliation that promoted the need for a new
nationalism, acted to reinforce “proved actions and feelings” in support
of the CC P. 27
22
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In many ways, post-1989 state policy was effective in fostering a
Chinese nationalism that was both fervent and directed outward in the
form of negative perceptions of the West. The belief that China’s
failure to secure the 2000 Olympic Games resulted from Western—
particularly American—bullying stands as one early example in the
1990s.28 While it is true that the awarding of the 2000 Olympic Games
to Sydney was tainted by bribery charges,29 the assertion of an antiChina conspiracy seems firmly rooted in the discourse of national hu
miliation. Similarly, the television drama A Beijinger in New York and
the publication of books such as China Can Say No and The Plot to
Demonize China indicate the growing presence of fervent nationalistic
sentiment and the incorporation of Party rhetoric into elements of
popular culture during the mid-1990s. This is not to say that individu
als were wholly co-opted into the state’s ideology, but the appearance of
such works indicates that the discourse of state ideology was pervasive.
The revival of national humiliation discourse was also evident during
the recent celebration of the PRC’s 60th anniversary, where usersubmitted comments on the People’s Daily website boasted, “Proud to
be Chinese! Never again will China be humiliated by foreign powers!
China and Taiwan united will never be defeated!”30
The influence of the state on the expression of Chinese
nationalism was, perhaps, most visible in the reactions to NATO’s
1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. In “ Tears of R age:
Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing ,”
Peter Hays Gries presents a number of letters that emerged in Chinese
28
Peter Hessler, Oracle Bones: A Journey Between China’s Past and Present (New
York: Harper Collins, 2006), 265; Edward Friedman, “Still Building the Nation: The
Causes and Conse quences of China’s Patriotic Fer vor,” in Chinese Political Culture,
1989-2000, 103-132 (see note 13), 125.
29
“Olympics—Did $70,000 in Ple dges Buy Votes for Sydney ?” The Seattle Times,
Januar y 23, 1999, http ://communit y.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19990
123&slug=2940183 (accesse d November 15, 2009).
30
“Blessing s to the Motherland,” postings on the People’s Daily website, 60th Anni
versary of the Founding of the PRC, http ://english.people.com.cn/90002/
97623/index.html (accessed November 27, 2009). PRC refers to the People’s Republic of
China, the government of mainland China which claims to have authority over the island
of Taiwan, known formally as The Republic of China on Taiwan.
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newspapers following the Belgrade bombing to argue that the
outpouring of passionate—if not angry—nationalistic and patriotic
sentiments in the aftermath of the bombing should be viewed as
“genuine and understandable” rather than as byproducts of
government-sponsored propaganda.31 However, while the emotion may
have been genuine—and justifiable—the language utilized to express
this emotion reflected the state-led patriotic education campaign and
the revival of national humiliation discourse.
An article that appeared in the People’s Daily, for instance, was
clearly framed by the discourse of national humiliation in its emphasis
of the continued strength of China in the face of Western aggression:
The wheel of history will not go backward. This is 1999, not
1899. This is not…the age when people can barge about the
world in gunboats…It is not the age when the Western powers
plundered the Imperial Palace at will, destroyed the Old Sum
mer Palace, and seized Hong Kong and Macao…China is a
China that has stood up; it is a China that defeated the Japa
nese fascists; it is a China that had a trial of strength and won
victory over the United States on the Korean battleground.
The Chinese people are not to be bullied, and China's sover
eignty and dignity are not to be violated…US-led NATO had
better remember this.32
Other authors similarly expressed anger over U.S. attempts to humiliate
China and argued for China to reassert its sovereignty and take action
against the U.S.33 While some might contend that the act of Chinese
citizens demanding that the state exact an aggressive response is indica
tive of a “bottom-up” response, these demands nonetheless act to
reinforce the notion of the Party as the “national will.”
31
Peter Hays Gries, “ Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade
Embassy Bombing ,” The China Journal 46 ( July 2001): 26.
32
Han Zhong kun, “Zhongguo, bushi yibajiujiu [ This is Not 1899 China],” People’s
Daily, May 12, 1999, translated and quoted in Gries, “ Tears of Rage,” 32.
33
Gries, “ Tears of Rage,” 33, 37-40.
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The presence of anti-Western patriotism underscored by the
discourse of national humiliation is also evident in Peter Hessler’s
firsthand account in Oracle Bones, which describes protesters shouting
“Down with American imperialism!” and directing their anger at local
American businesses like McDonald’s.34 Hessler also recounts conversa
tions with local Chinese who rebuked the United States’ perception of
itself as a world police power and occasionally brought up the legacy of
the Opium War in the midst of venting their ange r.35
Thus, the reconstruction of state hegemony in the 1990s—what I
call a velvet prison with Chinese characteristics—was fundamentally
underscored by the ideolog y of patriotism and national humiliation.
Just as Haraszti argues that socialist governments in Eastern Europe
utilized “relics” to present themselves as the guardians of tradition,36 the
CCP has also sought to exercise a monopoly on patriotism in order to
direct such sentiment toward state legitimization and the support of
Party authority. As seen in incidents like the Belgrade bombing , this
policy had a significant impact on public discourse and the shaping of
post-1989 culture. However, by invoking the ambiguous ideology of
patriotism, the state also created a considerable “g ray” area for cultural
discourse—one that, by allowing a certain degree of tolerance for dissi
dents, also allowed individuals to transform the state and, therefore, to
challenge the state’s attempt to exercise a monopoly on Chinese culture.
THE PRAGM ATIC SHIF T:
PUBLIC DISCOUR SE WITHIN THE VE LVET PRISON
Although the state has acted to reinvent and reassert its hegemonic
position, it does not possess a monopoly on cultural construction in
post-1989 China. In part, this stems from the nature of the ideolog y of
patriotism, which, as an ambiguous concept, has created a considerable
“gray” area for public discourse. While the state has sometimes acted to
visibly define the scope of patriotism through the use of force, events in
post-1989 China tend to indicate that so long as China’s leaders or the
34
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authority of the Chinese Communist Party are not publicly attacked,
all sorts of discourses are tolerated.37
In The Velvet Prison, Haraszti argues that although state socialism
prescribes certain rules, the artist is not inherently constrained: “In our
eyes the state represents not a monolithic body of rules but rather a live
network of lobbies. We play with it, we know how to use it, and we
have allies and enemies at the controls.”38 Likewise, post-1989 Chinese
society has also been characterized by discourses articulated in the
framework of state ideolog y. By doing so, individuals in China have
been able to exact change on the state itself. Although changes may be
minor and incremental, they nonetheless undermine the state’s attempt
to exercise a monopoly on culture.
There are a number of reasons for the transition to a more “prag
matic dissent” in post-1989 China. A general fear of chaos and disorder
seems particularly important. While many have written about the
Party’s desire to avoid a return to the disorder of the Cultural Revolu
tion or Tiananmen protests, few have acknowledged that the general
population also has a vested interest in national stability. Chinese stu
dents, for example, became increasingly involved in the Party and less
likely to voice idealistic opposition to state policy after the June 4
protests as self-interest and career advancement became predominant
factors.39 Likewise, economic reform has left many individuals less
willing to sacrifice the stability of the state, which is often viewed as an
important source of material gain.40
Despite being less visible, this pragmatic approach has created pro
found developments in contemporary Chinese culture. By exploring
three particular events—the publication of China Can Say No, the
development of “cultural t-shirts,” and the “nail house” resistance to
37
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ed. Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen, 141-158 (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004),
144.
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government redevelopment—I hope to show how public discourse has
operated within China’s velvet prison to counter the state’s attempts to
monopolize Chinese culture.
China Can Say No: Directing Nationalism at the Party
Published in 1996, China Can Say No criticized Western—particularly
U.S.—influence in China and became a major commercial success. De
scribed by Newsweek as “a shrill anti-U.S. polemic,”41 the book was
initially supported by the Chinese government as a genuine reflection
of public opinion.42 Indeed, China Can Say No was so successful that it
spurred a whole wave of “say no” literature that echoed the growing
anti-American nationalism emerging in the 1990s. Actively trying to
co-opt the discourse into the framework of pro-Party ideology, the state
often confined negative reviews of such “say no” literature abroad to
places like Hong Kong and Taiwan.43
Yet, despite seeming to reflect the state’s patriotic and national
humiliation rhetoric, China Can Say No undermined the government
monopoly on nationalistic discourse. By projecting themselves as the
embodiment of popular opinion and making claims that, essentially,
made demands of the state, the authors of China Can Say No and other
“say no” literature challenged the traditional dominance of the Party.
Ben Xu remarks, “While [popular nationalists] direct their attack
explicitly against foreigners, the present government is held implicitly
to account for yielding too readily to foreign political and commercial
demands and for surrendering China’s national dignity in the proc
ess.”44 It was this aspect of the “say no” literature that ultimately re
sulted in an about-face by the state, which openly criticized China Can
41
Ge orge Wehfritz, “Banned in Beijing : The Masses Love Pulp Fiction. Officials
Don’t,” Newsweek, October 28, 1996, http ://www.newsweek.com/id/103151 (accesse d
November 24, 2009).
42
Peter Hays Gries, “Popular Nationalism and State Legitimation,” in State and
Society in 21st-Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation, 180-194 (see note
40), 186.
43
Ibid. 187.
44
Ben Xu, “Chinese Populist Nationalism: Its Intellectual Politics and Moral Di
lemma,” Representations 76 (Autumn 2001): 133.
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Say No in December 1996, cracked down on the proliferation of “say
no” literature, and banned the book’s sequel, China Can Still Say No.45
Although the state ultimately suppressed the “say no” craze, these
works still influenced the state’s development. Attempting to buttress
its position as the embodiment of the nation’s will, government efforts
to co-opt the expression of popular nationalism simultaneously re
quired the state to infuse itself with “nonofficial discourse.” After
reversing its position on China Can Say No, for example, the Party
sought “to persuade the people to let the Party maintain its leading role
in Chinese nationalism and foreign policy-making.”46 The publication
of China Should Not Play ‘Mr. No’, for instance, praised the “righteous
anger” of popular nationalists while also claiming that “emotion cannot
substitute for policy.”47 While proclaiming the ultimate authority of the
state, the response’s legitimization of popular nationalism also under
mined the government’s claim to a monopoly on cultural
construction—although citizens could not make policy, they could
enter the debate of nationalism and exert pressure on the state.
“Cultural T-shirts”: Wearing the Nonofficial
Predating the “say no” craze, the appearance of so-called “cultural tshirts” in Beijing in the early 1990s demonstrates the ability of “dissi
dent” discourses to affect the state. The cultural t-shirts that appeared
in 1991 were largely the work of entrepreneur-artist Kong Yongqian.
Although he insisted that his widely successful t-shirt designs were not
intended to be politically provocative, Kong’s shirts, in effect, used
“nonofficial colloquial language to communicate sentiments that many
people shared but were unable to give voice to in public.”48 In this re
gard, Kong’s shirts were an undeniably populist and nationalistic
project.
In June of 1991, Kong was detained for questioning by the Chi
nese police, who told him that his shirts were the most serious political
45
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incident in Beijing since June 4, 1989.49 His shirts were subsequently
banned and his unsold merchandise was confiscated and destroyed. Yet,
in the face of government opposition, Kong defended his shirts with
patriotic language, arguing that he was simply trying to create an
inexpensive product that reflected Beijing sentiments rather than those
of Hong Kong , Taiwan, or the United States.50
However, Kong’s t-shirts still possessed a populist element that
profoundly threatened the state. According to Geremie Barmé :
The shirts would also provide people with an opportunity to
release pent-up emotions and frustrations, regardless of
whether they were personal, social, or political. It was this
dimension of the t-shirt craze—that of a popular, unspoken
conspiracy of self-expression writ in large in satirical and
ironic terms—that the authorities may well have found
unsettling.51
As a “passive” mode of expression, Kong’s shirts allowed people to vent
their opinions in a safe, non-confrontational manner that made it diffi
cult for government authorities to silence. Moreover, by informalizing
individual expression and allowing individuals to have control over
nationalistic expression—in ways that often satirized official state
rhetoric—Kong’s shirts significantly undermined the Party’s control
over national identity discourse and weakened its ability to impose an
ordered, cohesive national identity.
From the state’s perspective, Kong’s t-shirt designs were not only a
challenge to state authority, but were also harmful to socialist morality.
While detained, Kong’s interrogators scrutinized every detail of his
designs, whether it was imagery that, they felt, projected the state as evil
or his orientation of a particular Chinese character that they believed to
be a reference to the Cultural Revolution.52
49
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Fig. 1: “Making Ends Meet.” A T-shirt desig n by Kong Yong qian. (Photograph by Lois
Conne r, from Geremie R . Barmé, In the Red : On Contemporary Chinese Culture. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1999 [Photo Insert].)

The t-shirt “Making Ends Meet,” which featured a large pocket
containing documents such as a monthly bus pass, cloth and grain ra
tions, meal tickets, a name card, and a secret bank account record, was
of particular concern to the police, who accused Kong of being an anti
government activist. Suspicious of his inclusion of outdated govern
ment documents, many of which dated from the Mao period, the police
chided, “You’re resentful of the government’s long-term policies, aren’t
you?…Why do you despise the socialist system so much?”53 While Kong
defended his design and the inclusion of such outdated documents as an
act of nostalgia, his work can nonetheless be seen as subversive for
recalling images of China’s more austere past during a period in which
the state preferred to emphasize the population’s dramatic material
gain. In a similar manner, other t-shirt designs also subverted
government ideology by borrowing commonly used government catch
53
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Red, 162.
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phrases—often satirizing official responses to the June 4 protests in the
process—and by highlighting elements of Chinese society that officials
often denied or preferred to ignore.
Kong’s shirts were eventually removed from the market, but,
curiously, he was released from detainment after paying a small fine—a
seemingly minor punishment for what the police had called the most
serious political incident since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.
Meanwhile, similar, though less provocative shirts remained on the
market. In fact, the government even tried to co-opt the t-shirt craze in
support of its bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics. However, the
“barbed cynicism” still persisted in these cultural t-shirts and thus
gradually became enmeshed within mainstream culture. While the
“dissidence” may have been scaled back, these shirts nonetheless weak
ened state control on cultural construction and forced the state to ac
commodate exhibitions of individuality that had emerged outside of
official culture.
“I Have a Responsibility to Protect this Place”:
Challenging China’s “Urban Renewal”
Urbanization and “urban renewal” have been defining features of
China’s road to “modernization” as the state has sought to remove “im
pediments to progress” and transform China “from a backward
agricultural country” into an advanced industrial nation.54 In the years
leading up to the 2008 Summer Olympics, Western media became
fascinated by the wave of redevelopment sweeping across China. Images
such as the Chongqing “nail house” were depicted as embodying “the
discontent of people who are suddenly uprooted, told that they must
make way for a new skyscraper or golf course or industrial zone.”55 In
fact, The New York Times found the Chongqing nail house unusual for
the reason that the owners were able to “hold out” for so long in a
54
Hessler, 179; “Urbanization Makes Life Better,” People’s Daily, August 27, 2009,
http ://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/6741524.html (accessed November
28, 2009).
55
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03/27/world/asia/27china.html (accessed November 25, 2009).
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Fig. 2: A “Nail House” in China’s Chongqing Municipality. (Photog raph by China
Photos/Getty Imag es, from Howard W. French, “Homeowner Stares Down Wreckers, at
Least for a While,” The New York Times, March 27, 2007,
http ://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/27/world/asia/27china.html [accessed November
25, 2009].)

country where many were arrested or even beaten for protesting
eviction from their homes.56
However, what is most intriguing is not that they resisted so visi
bly, but how they framed their resistance. When asked about her
resistance by the China Daily, owner Wu Ping boldly stated, “I wanted
to safeguard my dignity and lawful rights.”57 Coupled with the fact that
the owners waved the PRC flag atop their home, the struggle emerged
as a form of patriotism. The owners projected themselves not as oppo
nents of the state, but as fighting to uphold the integrity of the state by
using the law to obtain adequate compensation for a house that had
been passed down through generations.
Peter Hessler provides a similar example in his profiling of Zhao
Jingxin’s struggle to resist the demolition of his home in an old hutong
neighborhood. Like the owners of the “nail house,” Zhao justified his
resistance in patriotic rhetoric, exclaiming , “This house is older than the
56
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United States of America!”58 It was not a matter of money, Zhao ex
plained to Hessler, “As a Chinese person, I have a responsibility to
protect this place. I won’t leave willingly.”59
Zhao’s suit against the government was one of many that occurred
in the late 1990s. According to Hessler, successful suits received promi
nent coverage as a sign of government fairness. However, most failed
and were never heard about in the public sphere.60 Irrespective of the
inconsistent government response, the fact that citizens were able to use
state rhetoric to question the government for the sake of their own
personal interest represents a challenge to the state’s control over patri
otic and cultural discourse. Not only must the state co-opt discontent
through material reward (e.g., a new apartment and lofty financial
compensation), but the state must also respond to challenges that de
mand that it to exemplify the rhetoric it has propagated to fortify its
own legitimacy. That the proliferation of “nail house” protests spurred
the passage of a new property law in 2007 indicates the extent to which
the individual’s use of state rhetoric against the state has forced the
Party to make incremental changes in order to maintain its hegemonic
position.61
CU LTURE COMMERCIALIZED: FORCES OF A MARKET ECONOMY
Of the major trends in post-1989 China, the emergence of a vibrant
market economy has been among the most visible and profound. While
Deng Xiaoping tried to downplay the ideological contradictions of
creating a quasi-capitalist system in a socialist state, the introduction of
a market economy nevertheless exerts new forces on China that act on
both the state and society.
Liu Kang has described popular commercial culture in China as a
“new battleground” of culture and ideolog y wherein battles are waged
58
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through “symbolic acts.”62 Similarly, Arif Dirlik has pointed out that
China’s economic reforms have “changed life at the everyday level in
transforming the habits of consumption—of culture no less than the
commodities of everyday life.”63
In addition, economic reform has significantly altered the ways in
which citizens interact with the government. The state’s pragmatic
approach towards economic development—which has, by all means,
become a form of performative legitimacy—has allowed a considerable
degree of freedom that influences not only the state-society relation
ship, but also the ways in which traditional state ideolog y is received. As
Liu argues, “Political demystification and economic decentralization
have drastically reduced the authority of the CCP leadership…[state
ideolog y] is reduced to nothing more than political rhetoric in an in
creasingly pluralistic society.”64
Yet, state influence still pervades commercial culture. The success
of foreign corporations in China, for example, has simultaneously pro
duced both “ Westernization” and resistance. Reflecting the post-1989
nationalistic fervor, many Chinese have sought to develop competing
brands and enterprises that more accurately reflect the “Chineseness” of
economic reform.65 In this regard, the forces of the market economy
have become enmeshed into the construction of cultural identity and
may come into conflict with the ideolog y of state-led patriotism and
fears of renewed national humiliation.
Symbolic Battles: Ideology and Advertisement
A significant result of China’s market reforms has been the growth of
private advertising. While advertising is often a manipulative act, Barmé
has observed that in China, “[targeted advertising ] was a marked con
trast to the previous ways in which people were targeted”—commercial
culture created a sense of “consumer empowerment” in which the
62
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consumers felt less like a product of state propaganda and more like an
individual being catered to.66 However, consumer culture in China was
neither a byproduct of propaganda nor a triumph of individualistic
market forces. Instead, it became a realm of hybridized culture in which
state rhetoric was present but often refashioned for the purposes of
material gain.
While market reforms diminished the role of the state in the econ
omy, the state has not remained neutral. In fact, it has often acted to
funnel commercial culture into areas that reinforce state objectives. Jing
Wa ng , for example, argues that “weekend culture in China is first and
foremost an official discourse born from well-calculated state policy.”67
With the emergence of a number of consumer publications in the mid
1990s, the state acted to “[educate] the masses about how to consume
cultural and commodity goods, and, above all, how to consume leisure
itself.”68 Augmented by the introduction of a forty-hour workweek, the
state’s leisure discourse promoted activities requiring capital expendi
ture in order to develop a culture of consumption that furthered
economic growth and affirmed the Party’s role as a competent
government. It was a culture that promoted “lifestyle shopping” and,
infused with the ideologies of patriotism and national humiliation,
became the source of the “modern construction of the spiritual civiliza
tion.”69
However, as the state has acted to maintain its hegemonic position
in post-1989 China, it has had to compete with trendier elements of
global commercial culture that tend to enjoy greater mass appeal. In
response, the state has tried to “modernize” its messages, using , in one
particular case, neon slogan boards, computer images, and ad displays in
Beijing to deliver the messages of a new “spiritual civilization” cam
paign.70 Influenced by the nearby success of “Kong-Tai” culture, the
66
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state sought to refashion itself through new corporate identities, “mod
ernized” journalism, and mainstream appeal.71
But, just as the Party tried to further its appeal through
commercial culture, commercial culture has manipulated state rhetoric
in order to make a profit. An insecticide, for example, was advertised
using language from a 1963 poem written by Mao, proclaiming, “Away
with all pests!”72 In a similar manner, a vacuum commercial remarked,
“dust won’t disappear of its own accord,” a clear reference to Mao’s
declaration that reactionaries would have to be swept away like dust.73
While it is not unusual for companies to employ official discourse
for their own profit, the reformulated rhetoric in China is profound in
that its use is fundamentally at odds with its ideological significance.
On one hand, this reinforces the strength of the Party as part of soci
ety’s collective consciousness, but it also makes state rhetoric subject to
the needs of individuals and diminishes its inherent meaning. While the
Party remains in a position of authority, the symbols of its hegemony
become malleable as the state, the market, and the individual construct
their own cultural niches.
CONCLUSION
China’s cultural development since 1989 has thus been underscored by
a complex interaction between the state, society, and the market. I have
argued that this relationship can be conceptualized as “a velvet prison
with Chinese characteristics.” The events of Tiananmen Square have
undoubtedly been significant in the construction of this velvet prison.
In the aftermath of June 4, the state—that is, the Chinese Communist
Party—acted quickly to reassert its claim to hegemony by utilizing the
discourse of patriotism and by reviving the rhetoric of national humilia
tion.
While the state has been reasonably successful in establishing and
maintaining its legitimacy, the ambiguous nature of its new hegemonic
71
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ideolog y, combined with the forces of economic reform, has allowed a
considerable degree of individual freedom that has ultimately under
mined the state’s ability to exercise a monopoly on the development of
culture. Hence, while the state tries to control the evolution of Chinese
culture from “the top,” individuals and economic forces simultaneously
affect the state, resulting in new relationships that redefine the role of
the state and the ways in which the populace understands its ideolog y.
Moreover, the success of the penetration of state ideolog y has been
a double-edged sword. While the diffusion of patriotic and national
humiliation based discourses have often been useful in developing a
pro-government mentality, groups and individuals have been able to use
official ideolog y to make demands of the state and challenge the
legitimacy of the state’s claims.
The CCP’s recent commitment to the development of a
“harmonious society” attests to the changing nature of state power.
Although “harmonious society” may imply a silencing of dissidence,
harmony is also a concept based upon the synthesis of different
elements. While this does not include “dissonant” elements, it does
represent a departure from previous generations that sought to impose a
monolithic cultural and economic order. In this regard, it seems that
China’s future will be marked by the continued interaction of “a live
network of lobbies” that further transform Chinese culture within the
framework of China’s velvet prison.
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THE HOUSEWIFE’S BATTLE ON THE HOME FRONT:
WOMEN IN WORLD WAR II ADVE RTISEMENTS
By Caroline Cornell
A 1944 advertisement for Swift’s Beef in Good Housekeeping boldly
proclaimed, “Her SEVEN jobs all help win the war!”1 The seven “jobs”
were tasks that the Swift Company—as well as the U.S. government—
believed that women on the home front should perform in order to aid
their country during World War II. Among the tasks promoted by the
advertisement were rationing, the growing of “victory gardens,” salvag
ing and recycling, and the purchasing of war bonds. Though the
advertisement claimed that these responsibilities “all help win the war,”
each of the jobs described centered around household activities. Despite
the fact that the Swift’s Beef advertisement gave agency to American
women by claiming they could impact the success of the war, it still
emphasized their femininity by giving primacy to the roles of wife and
mother and by utilizing an image of a Red Cross volunteer as their “war
worker,” not a woman working in the war industry.
1

“Her Seven Jobs Help Win the War,” Swift’s Brands of Be ef, Advertisement, Good
Housekeeping, January 1944, 15.
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The Good Housekeeping advertisement exemplifies how World
War II advertisements not only frequently targeted American women
to aid the war effort, but also placed the responsibility of obtaining vic
tory in the hands of the housewife. To some, this may appear as a
surprising contrast to the popular image of “Rosie the Riveter” that
tends to dominate modern-day conceptions of the representation of
American women during World War II. In this paper, however, I will
argue that, although women were entering the workforce in large num
bers during World War II, the U.S. government and the advertising
industry believed American housewives to be as vital to the war’s suc
cess as “Rosie the Riveter.” While numerous scholars argue that
housewives were a major contributing factor to America’s victory in
World War II, they often neglect the ways in which advertisements
largely ignored the roles of working women during the war. World War
II era advertisements and posters glorified and elevated the status of the
housewife, which, I will argue, encouraged women to remain in a sphere
of domesticity during, as well as after, the war.
To fully comprehend the depiction of American women in adver
tisements, it is important to look at advertisements created by both the
U.S. government and private American companies during the war. T.J.
Jackson Lears has used the term “hegemony” to describe the ways in
which a particular ruling class relies on various intellectual groups to
establish a society’s conventional wisdom.2 This relationship was evi
dent during World War II when the attacks on Pearl Harbor not only
caused the U.S. government to enter World War II, but also to enter a
partnership with the advertising industry. This intimate relationship is
apparent in the creation of the War Advertising Council in 1942,
wherein the government and private industry began a string of adver
tisements aimed at directly shaping the opinion of the American
2
T. J. Jackson Lears, “From Salvation to Self-Realization: Advertising and the
Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer Culture, 1880-1930,” in The Culture of Consump
tion: Critical Essays in American History, 1880-1980, e d. Richard Wightman Fox and T. J.
Jackson Lears, 3-38 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 5. The term “hegemony” was
orig inally create d by Antonio Gramsci.
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public.3 Lears’s observations on the “therapeutic ethos” are also
applicable to World War II advertisements as advertisers began to make
greater use of therapeutic and psychological techniques to attract the
attention of consumers and sell their products or ideas.4 Because the
war was an extremely emotional time for families at home, it was easy
for advertisers to utilize these tactics.
While the U.S. government used the advertising industry as a vehi
cle for the dispersion of messages to the masses, advertisers also had
numerous motives in entering a partnership with the government. In
exploring the relationships between the U.S. government and the ad
vertising industry throughout World War II, both Robert Griffith and
Mark Leff have argued that the advertising industry used the war as a
means to lift the industry from its dire financial state. While Griffith
highlights the immense profit reaped by advertisers during the war, Leff
goes further and labels the industry’s motivations as selfish. Moreover,
Leff contends that such self-interest was representative of the general
American population.5 He claims that because Americans were dis
tanced from the physical conflict of the wars in Europe and the Pacific,
the government had to work harder to convince Americans that they
ought to sacrifice goods and luxuries to aid the war effort.6 In this sense,
the creation of the War Advertising Council was as essential for the
struggling advertising industry as it was for the Office of War Informa
tion, which relied on influential advertisements to sway public opinion.
Understanding these “selfish motives” provides insight into the under
lying messages of many World War II advertisements and their
intended audience—which was, in many cases, women.
Though both Griffith and Leff recognize conflicting motives
within the creation of advertisements, they ignore how the government,
as well as the advertising industry, targeted the American housewife.
They also fail to recognize and analyze why household advertisements
3
Robert Griffith, “The Selling of America: The Advertising Council and American
Politics, 1942-1960,” The Business History Review 57, no. 3 (Autumn 1983): 390.
4
Lears, 21.
5
Griffith, 391.
6
Mark Leff, “The Politics of Sacrifice on the American Home-Front in World War
II,” The Journal of American History 77, no. 4 (March 1991): 1310-1314.
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peaked during the war years, an observation duly noted by Russell Belk
and Richard Pollay.7 That domestic-centered advertisements peaked
during the war years suggests not only that the government and the
advertising industry were deliberately targeting a particular demo
graphic, but also suggests that they were consciously emphasizing that
women should return to their “proper places” at home at the conclu
sion of the war.
The emphasis on encouraging women to remain at home is evident
in advertisements concerning rationing policies. Such advertisements
portrayed the housewife as critical to the success of rationing policies
and simultaneously encouraged women to continue with their domestic
duties by exalting their daily tasks as critical to the war’s success. Adver
tisements not only called on women to buy groceries according to
rationing policies, but also included ways that women could cope with
rationing and product scarcity. Rationing coupons became a common
accessory when women went grocery shopping, and housewives had to
learn how to alter their favorite recipes due to the scarcity of certain
ingredients. Traditionally imported goods, including sugar, spices, cof
fee, and tin (used for canned food), became extremely hard to acquire
since crops were often ravaged by war or difficult to transport due to
fuel shortages.8 Advertisements also called on American women to help
enforce rationing policies and recognized that because females made up
the majority of the consumer population buying groceries, they had a
large amount of influence on whether or not the policies were
successful.
John D. Morris, a journalist for The New York Times, stressed the
importance of female consumers and urged them to use their influence
to directly aid the government with rationing. As a congressional affairs
correspondent, Morris called on housewives to help the government
end the problem of black markets and counterfeit coupons, which had
become a negative consequence of the food rationing policies and were
7
Russell W. Belk and Richard W. Pollay, “Images of Ourselves: The Good Life in
Twentieth Century Advertising ,” The Journal of Consumer Research 11, no. 4 (March
1985): 890.
8
Doris Weatherford, American Women and World War II (New York: Facts on
File, 1990), 200.
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harming the war economy. While discussing meat rationing in one of
his articles, Morris stated “enforcement will be aided if a housewife
reports to her ration board that her neighbor has plenty of meat, while
she herself is limited to, say, two pounds a week.”9 This direct call to
American housewives demonstrates the belief that cooperation from
American housewives was essential to the success of rationing policies.
Although Morris’s call to action indicates a suspicion that some women
were abusing rationing policies, it also encourages other housewives to
combat the criminal acts by using the simple tasks that they already
performed before the war—acts like grocery shopping and snooping out
their neighbors. This trust in American women added an element of
respect and admiration to their daily routine, and showed the belief
that they could not only be relied on to carry out rationing policies, but
could also be necessary allies for the battle on the home front.
Instead of emphasizing the national importance of implementing
rationing policies, some American companies chose to manipulate ex
isting frustrations that women had concerning rationing in order to
gain a profit. Rationing had forced many women to alter their favorite
recipes to accommodate the lack of certain ingredients. In response to
this, numerous cookbooks emerged advertising recipes that suited lim
ited ingredients—such as “sugarless recipes”—while continuing to
ensure quality, well-balanced meals. A 1940s cookbook compiled by
Marion White, for example, was described as “a ‘must’ for every Ameri
can housewife,” and promised female consumers that they would “never
worry about sugar rationing with this thrilling book which tells you
how to make tempting, tasty, delicious desserts without sugar.”10 This
shows how the advertisers and the cookbook company automatically
connected the task of rationing with housewives, and implied that one
was an inadequate wife and mother if they did not adhere to their pa
triotic duties. Not only did cookbooks like Marion White’s serve as an
example of how companies used wartime conditions to sell their prod
9
John D. Morris, “Policing of the Food Front up to Housewife in the End,” The
New York Times, Fe bruary 28, 1943.
10
Sweets without Sugar cookbook, M.S. Mill Co., Inc., Advertisement, The New
York Times, June 10, 1942 .The cited advertisement originally appeared on page 19.
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ucts, but it also epitomizes the ways in which housewives were
specifically targeted and believed to be the leading force in policies
relating to consumption.
Some food companies opted for a more indirect approach to
advertising when dealing with rationing by including recipes that were
suited for the war environment. A 1944 Swift’s Beef advertisement
provides an example of this strategy. The advertisement included a pot
roast recipe with a statement that urged women to pay close attention
while cooking to preserve the nutritional value of their food and make
the most of their meat, which was hard to come by due to food short
ages.11 The advertisement recognized that housewives were significantly
affected by rationing policies and thus tried to help them maintain their
supremacy in the kitchen despite the resulting hardships of the period.
It also links the recipe with the product’s name in order to maintain
brand recognition both during and after the war. By helping consumers
deal with restrictions on food products, companies were also able to
create a positive image for themselves when housewives were able to
purchase their products again.
The government also relied on advertisements in order to promote
solutions to the drastic decrease in the amount of available food as a
consequence of the war, particularly shortages of produce. “Victory
gardens” were commonly advertised as an answer to the problems
brought on by rationing and were presented as both a way for women
to help feed their own families and a means to aid the government by
decreasing the amount of dependence on American farmers. Women
were urged to grow their own vegetables—about 20 million Americans
eventually planted victory gardens and community gardens were set up
in some towns using available vacant plots of land.12 Advertisements
created by the War Advertising Council urged Americans, mainly
11

“Her Seven Jobs Help Win the Wa r.” Swift’s Brands of Beef Advertisement.
Har vard Sitkoff, “The American Home Front,” in Produce and Conserve, Share
and Play Square: The Grocer and the Consumer on the Home-Front Battlefield during
World War II, ed. Barbara McLean Ward, 36-56 (Hanove r, NH: University Press of
New England, 1994), 44; Mary Drake McFe ely, “The War in the Kitchen,” in Produce
and Conserve, Share and Play Square: The Grocer and the Consumer on the Home-Front
Battlefield during World War II, 104-116 (se e above), 110
12
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women, to not only grow their own vegetables, but to can their produce
to save for the winter.
One such advertisement featured a mother and daughter canning
the vegetables from their garden. The girl is pictured asking her mother,
“We’ll have lots to eat this winter, won’t we mother?” The mother is
featured smiling and at the bottom of the page the advertisement states,
“Grow your own, can your own.”13 The advertisement employs a thera
peutic ethos by picturing a mother and daughter and by delivering the
message that if women grow their own victory gardens, they will be able
to support their families with a sufficient amount of vegetables that may
not be available if they were to rely solely on American farmers. The
daughter toys with the emotions of American women by urging them
to view victory gardens as a necessity to protect their family from going
hungry, and thus, by encouraging them to tend their gardens, the adver
tisement is able to advocate that women remain at home.
Recognizing that American women desired a quick end to the war,
advertisements encouraging women to salvage and recycle materials
sought to establish a direct relationship between the home and the bat
tlefield, that would make women more receptive to the idea that their
daily actions affected the outcome of the war. Magazine articles “called
out” American women and argued that they were the reasons why the
battle on the home front was failing. An article in Life stated that
women had to help the country by conserving fats and tin, and attacked
them by saying, “Just remember that everything your family consumes
retards the war effort.”14 Though the article specifically relates to the
failures of domestic consumption policies, the attribution of blame
relative to the war effort recognizes housewives as the predominant
“fighting force” at home.
Not only were women recognized as “fighters” at home, scholars
have argued that advertisements and war campaigns caused a complete
13
Al Parke r, “ We ’ll Have Lots to Eat This Winter, Won’t We, Mother ?” (Poster,
U.S. Office of War Information, 1943) The Smithsonian Institute’s National Museum of
History, http ://americanhistor y.si.edu/victor y/victory5.htm (accesse d November 23,
2009).
14
“What Women Can Do : Think War, Buy Little, Maintain Our Ideals,” Life,
September 28, 1942, 32.
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militarization of the household. Typical household chores were turned
into “weapons of war,” which is especially evident with political posters
urging women to aid salvaging and recycling efforts.15 A poster created
by the War Production Board in 1941, which encouraged citizens to
salvage their tin cans, highlighted how they believed American women
had a direct impact on the success of the war overseas. It boldly stated,
“Save Your Cans: Help Pass the Ammunition,” and lists the four steps
that one must take to “Prepare your tin cans for war.” The poster pic
tures a woman’s arm holding a line of tin cans that eventually turn into
bullets for a fighting soldier’s machine gun.16 This poster illustrates how
the government used advertisements and posters to convince American
women that their salvaging and recycling habits at home directly influ
enced the fighting occurring in Europe and the Pacific. The argument
that the typical household became a direct extension of the battlefields
that American soldiers were fighting on helped to add importance to
the daily tasks conducted by housewives.
Despite the fact that numerous advertisements assisted in
militarizing the role of the housewife, Maureen Honey argues that
working women were seen as the bold heroines of the decade. House
wives, according to Honey, were depicted as the symbols of American
values and virtues that had to be safeguarded.17 Even though both
groups of women contributed greatly to the war effort, the housewife
was not portrayed to be as passive as Honey claims, especially if her
household tasks were viewed as “weapons of war.” By portraying these
women as directly aiding and partaking in the war effort, advertisers
portrayed their contributions from home to be equivalent to those
made by women working in the factories and war industry.
Along with increasing the importance of the jobs and duties of
American housewives during World War II, advertisements still advo
15
Terrence H. Witowski, “ World War II Poster Campaig ns: Preaching Frugality to
American Consumers,” Journal of Advertising 32, no. 1 ( Spring 2003): 74.
16
McClelland Barclay, “Save Your Cans” (Poste r, U.S. War Production Board,
1943) The Ohio Historical Society, http ://ohsweb.ohiohistory.org/ohiopix/
Image.cfm?ID=5020 (accessed November 24, 2009).
17
Maureen Hone y, Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender, and Propaganda
during World War II (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 131.
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cated that women follow their obligations as wives and mothers. The
images commonly remembered today—such as the famous “Rosie the
Riveter” image—were certainly present during the war years, but be
came less visible as the war came to a conclusion. Although Maureen
Honey seems to emphasize the image of working women above the
housewife during World War II, she does detail this shift in the por
trayal of both groups and shows how even advertisements that did focus
on the working mother sometimes included statements reiterating the
temporality of roles as a working woman.18 That advertisers felt the
need to state that jobs held by women during the war were purely provi
sional indicates a dramatic contrast to today’s image of female industry
workers as wartime “heroines.” Indeed, it suggests that advertisers did
not fully accept the new roles women occupied and expected post-war
society to return to more conservative gender roles.
An advertisement for the Adel Manufacturing Company featured
in a 1944 Saturday Evening Post illustrates this emphasis on temporary
occupation. In the advertisement, a mother is pictured in overalls lean
ing on her bike before she leaves for work. Her daughter is pictured in a
similar outfit and asks, “Mother, when will you stay home again?”
Above the image a statement reads, “Some jubilant day mother will stay
home again, doing the job she likes best—making a home for you and
daddy…Meanwhile she’s learning the vital importance of precision in
equipment made by ADEL. In her post-war home she’ll want appli
ances with the same high degree of precision.”19 Though the
advertisement recognizes the importance of the female worker in
helping the war effort, it clearly points out that women should return to
the home once the war ends. The advertisement also seizes on the emo
tions of American females, utilizing a therapeutic ethos once again to
make it appear that she is harming her children if she does not return to
her duties at home and implements particular words that are charged
with this sentiment. Phrases like “jubilant day” and “will stay home
18

Ibid., 124.
“Mother, when will you stay home again?” Adel Manufacturing Company,
Advertisement, in Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender, and Propaganda during
World War II (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 125.
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again” suggest that her place in the workforce is only positive because it
is temporarily filling an essential void in support of the war and that she
should revert to her “housewife occupation” as soon as possible.
Though advertisements often pictured working women, and regularly
cast them in a positive light, the fact that some advertisements viewed
females in the workplace as only a temporary advantage shows that
companies were still hesitant for women to abandon their responsibili
ties at home and enter the work force permanently.
The encouragement found in advertisements for women to remain
at home both during and after the war went so far as to urge them to
take control of areas in their household that they typically did not man
age. Despite the fact that women were not the main contributors to
their family’s income, they were given the task to budget their family’s
finances in order to set aside money for purchasing war bonds that di
rectly funded the war abroad. The government created war bonds,
modeled on the Liberty Bonds of World War I, as a way for American
citizens to help fund the war effort by essentially loaning the
government money along with a fixed interest rate. Numerous adver
tisements targeted women to purchase these war bonds and emphasized
that by doing so, they would be doing their part to aid the war effort.
This was seen in an advertisement created by the War Advertising
Council that outlined the different tasks women could do, which read,
“Help bring them back to you—Make yours a victory home!” The ad
vertisement features a home with a blue star hanging in the window
(signifying that someone in the family was serving in the military) and
states as their last bullet-point that women should save 10% of their
household’s income to purchase war bonds.20 By having a blue star as
the main focus of the advertisement it targets the emotions of numer
ous American women who had husbands, sons, brothers, or other loved
ones fighting in the war. The advertisement seems to claim that, by
purchasing war bonds and assisting the war effort, women could help to
20
Francis Criss, “Help bring them back to you! ...Make yours a Victor y Home!”
(Poste r, U.S. Office of War Information, 1943) The Smithsonian Institute’s National
Museum of History, http ://americanhistory.si.edu/victory/victory5.htm (accessed May
7, 2009).
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end the war and bring their men home—an convincing incentive for
women to purchase war bonds.
Women responded to these advertisements by purchasing war
bonds in large numbers. Mary Appling, a college student during the
war, remembers that there were war bond sales at the high school she
worked at. Appling remembers, “After several years I had amassed
$1500 worth of $25 bonds, at $18.50 per purchase. That was not a lot,
but my salary was only about $1900 yearly during the time.”21 This
shows that advertisements for war bonds were successful since women
were going beyond setting aside saved money and putting the majority
of their income towards the purchasing of war bonds. Not only were
women tightening their purchasing habits, but they were able to supply
the government with an emergency amount of revenue for the war.
War bonds were also advertised as a means for women to aid the
success of the post-war economy by saving money for the household
appliances that would become available after the war. Advertisements
showed that if women cut down on consumption during the war in
order to purchase war bonds it would not only result in a war victory,
but would have a major impact on the post-war economy when women
were able to purchase products for their homes again. Numerous adver
tisements displayed in Ladies’ Home Journal and Good Housekeeping
show how companies were targeting women to continue to buy and
consume the products that were available to them, as well as to save
money in anticipation for the products that would be available during
peacetime.22 An advertisement for Emerson Electric home appliances
stated, “The war bonds you buy today will pay for the new appliances
and comfort conveniences you’ll want after victory.”23 The company
encouraged women to save their money in order to buy war bonds that
21
Mary L. Appling , “Behind the Combat,” in Women of the Homefront: World Wa r
II Recollections of 55 Americans, ed. Pauline E . Parker (London: McFarland & Company,
Inc., 2002), 207.
22
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23
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Housekeeping, March 1944, 139.
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would not only help the current war effort, but would allow them to
purchase the new technology available to them after the war. By pur
chasing new appliances and returning to their former consumption
habits, housewives would be able to maintain their respected position
after the war ended by improving the post-war economy.
Today the image of “Rosie the Riveter” is often revered as a symbol
of the empowered women who served as heroines on the home front
during World War II. However, a broader examination of the portrayal
of women during World War II suggests that the housewife was more
visibly depicted as a contributer to the fight for democracy overseas.
Advertisements from the war also show that the dominant opinion of
those in the advertising industry and government was that the home—
not the workplace—was the proper place for American women. Adver
tisements frequently pictured housewives as the leading force behind
the success of rationing policies, recycling efforts, and the purchasing of
war bonds. Housewives were also viewed positively for their role as con
sumers, which made them crucial to aiding the post-war economy.
Taken together, these factors indicate a profound difference
between present-day perceptions of “women on the home front” and
the actual roles of women that were stressed during World War II.
Though the wartime housewife is often overlooked today, she was the
primary target for advertisements by the government and private corpo
rations throughout the World War II period. Although advertisers
were certainly influenced by financial motivations, the consequence of
their work was an elevation of the domestic sphere, such that the
American housewife was often portrayed as integral to the war’s success
in a manner that was both respectful and empowering.
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“THE CHINA LOBBY”: INFLUENCES ON U.S.-CHINA
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST WAR PERIOD, 1949-1954
By Jeff Blackwell
Generally defined, the “China Lobby” was a broad network of people,
both foreign and domestic, whose interests coalesced around the goal of
overthrowing of communism in China. It consisted of well-financed
Nationalist Chinese officials in collaboration with right-wing U.S. po
litical elites who worked toward the common goal of supporting
Chiang Kai-shek’s recovery of mainland China from Mao Zedong and
the Communist forces.1 Aided by the anticommunist environment of
the 1950s, the Lobby’s loose affiliation of influential individuals—
including associates in the private sector, media, and politics—exerted
considerable pressure on U.S. foreign policy decisions concerning
China.
It is important to note that the term “lobby” in the United States
usually describes a private group that attempts to influence policy.
1
Ross H. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (New York: Harper & Row,
1974), ix-x. Koen’s book was actually withdrawn from publication—i.e., suppressed by
efforts of the China Lobby—after printing in 1960 to remain legally unpublished until
1974.
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Though similar, the China Lobby encompassed a more broadly based
consensus of individuals that cooperated in the promotion of anticom
munism and a pro-Chiang U.S. policy. Indeed, the Lobby operated in
an unconventional manner and existed without any particular leader or
organization at its center. Yet, it effectively exerted significant pressures
on the U.S. government without going through regular channels of
diplomacy. Moreover, the Lobby took advantage of U.S.
anticommunist sentiments by circulating propaganda associating sup
port of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime with loyalty to the United States and
the advocacy of democracy abroad.
This study will examine how the China Lobby attempted to influ
ence U.S. foreign policy toward a pro-Chinese Nationalist agenda in the
1950s. Using various tactics, including use of political lobbying,
sympathetic media outlets, and attacks on critics of pro-Nationalist
policy, the China Lobby distorted public and political perceptions re
garding U.S. policy toward China and effectively promoted a proChiang Kai-shek foreign policy. Indeed, the China Lobby indeed held
significant sway over U.S. foreign policy after 1949 and, particularly
after Mao’s victory in mainland China and the subsequent U.S. involve
ment in the Korean War, made use of an increasingly receptive
American public as the domestic climate in the United States became
increasingly anticommunist.
This examination of the China Lobby will scrutinize the organiza
tion’s political influence during the period 1949-1954 and will address
the following questions: What was the China Lobby? Who were mem
bers of the China Lobby? How, and why, did it form? What means did
the Lobby use to influence U.S.-China foreign policy? And, were the
Lobby’s efforts successful in exerting pressure on U.S. foreign policy
regarding China?
At the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, U.S-China relations
had reached an impasse. The Communists had defeated Chiang-Kai
shek’s forces and created a conundrum for U.S. policymakers. Many
had not foreseen the Communist victory and Chiang’s virtual exile to
the island of Taiwan raised new dilemmas for policy and exacerbated
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fears of Communist domination of Asia. As a Communist invasion of
the island seemed inevitable, the U.S. weighed its options.
U.S. policymakers were divided on the issue of whether to defend
Chiang on Taiwan if the Communists invaded. Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, who had dealt with Chiang extensively in WWII, preferred to
abandon the island, noting that if any of Chiang’s disciples controlled
the island it was doomed to fall to the Communists. For Acheson, the
primary goal was to wean Mao Zedong away from Stalin and Soviet
domination, thereby driving a wedge between the Communist states.
However, prominent Republican Senators William Knowland and
Robert Taft, joined by former President Herbert Hoover, vehemently
opposed such a course and demanded that the U.S. protect Taiwan.2
President Truman tended to agree with Acheson. In January 1950,
Truman issued a statement declaring that, while the U.S. would give
Taiwan financial assistance, U.S. military forces would not intervene
should the island fall victim to a Communist attack.3 Furthermore, the
current situation seemed to present a favorable opportunity for for
malized relations between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). The strongest opposition to formalizing relations with the PRC
rested with Chiang’s supporters in public office, but even they saw the
bleak reality of the Chinese Nationalist cause. Yet, in late June of 1955,
any hope of Acheson’s policy coming to fruition was unhinged by the
outbreak of the Korean War and the eventual Chinese involvement in
the conflict. Chiang Kai-shek supporters capitalized on the surge of
U.S. anticommunism and challenged the existing “China policy.”
The China Lobby coalesced in this political climate, bringing to
gether people with differing motives and varying degrees of interest in
China under the ideological banner of anticommunism. They
constituted a diverse and disparate group of individuals composed of
both public and private interests, including ardent supporters of
Chiang Kai-shek and those more interested in using the Lobby’s influ
ence to further their own agenda. Regardless of origin, the China Lobby
2
Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American
Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 166-167.
3
Ibid., 170.
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association, ranging from religious leaders and businessmen to
politicians and journalists, coalesced in a common purpose of anticom
munism and the Chinese Nationalist cause.
Part of the China Lobby’s success was due to the lack of centralized
structural organization. Even in contemporary studies a precise defini
tion of who the China Lobby consisted of is difficult to ascertain.
Indeed, the Lobby was certainly a mysterious entity in the 1950s. As
The New York Times reported in 1951, “The China Lobby, despite
references to it in and outside Congress, never has been presented in
any tangible shape.”4 However, despite the mystery surrounding the
organization, particular individuals were unquestionably involved in
the advocating the Lobby’s agenda.
Although members were all influential in their own right, among
the more notable was Alfred Kohlberg, a wealthy New York busi
nessman who would later become a fanatical anticommunist and proChiang supporter. He published over a dozen articles attacking the
United States’ non-interventionist policy toward China and those that
supported it and subsidized at least two magazines supporting his views.
He would also serve as chairman of the board of the American Chinese
Policy Association (ACPA), an organization that surpassed all others in
its directness of attacks on U.S. policy in China and contained consid
erable influence in Congress.5
Another intriguing affiliate of the China Lobby was Henry R.
Luce, publisher of Time and Life newsmagazines. Luce held an ardent
conviction that China was a prime target for U.S. uplift—whether as a
model of political and economic development, religious faith, or diplo
matic and military support. He also believed that Americans had a
categorical obligation to fulfill in China’s national destiny.
Unsurprisingly, he made Chiang Kai-shek the cover story of Time
magazine a record ten times.6 Henry Luce’s role in advocating the
4
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China Lobby’s agenda through his media outlets was a fundamental
aspect to the China Lobby’s success.
In 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party emerged victorious
in the Chinese Civil War, Lobby supporter’s worst fears were con
firmed about the spread of communism in Asia. The Communist vic
tory shocked many Americans, who had often associated Chiang’s
regime with the efforts to establish democracy in China. In the minds
of many Americans, the Communist victory was also equated a victory
for the Soviet Union. Due to this perception, a large portion of the
public, the press, and the membership of Congress came to believe the
charge that Chiang had been “sold out” by the U.S. government.7 The
development of closer relations between Peking and Moscow following
the Communist victory, combined with the anticommunist feeling this
engendered in the United States, made such allegations seem all the
more justified.
In response to accusations that the U.S. had abandoned Chiang
Kai-shek, the U.S. Department of State released the “China White Pa
per,” a massive volume of documents and explanations to justify its
policy of disengagement from the beleaguered Nationalist cause. By
emphasizing the fact that the United States was not responsible for the
fall of the Nationalist regime, the State Department sought to mollify
opponents of its non-interventionist China policy, or at least to justify
that policy to the American public in general. The effort failed, how
ever, and provided the Republican Party with a useful political issue.
Conservative members of the Republican Party saw their opportunity
to deride the Truman administration’s handling of events in China,
and they attached their interests to those of the China Lobby. In the
years to follow, the China Lobby bitterly charged that the State Depart
ment had “betrayed” Chiang, the United States’ wartime ally, and
launched campaigns to identify those allegedly responsible for the “loss”
of China to Communist forces.8 In this alarmist climate, the “loss” of
China debate helped to accelerate the momentum of the China Lobby.
7
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The Lobby’s hope for the success its agenda increased exponen
tially in June of 1950, when North Korean forces crossed the 38th
Parallel in a massive invasion of South Korea. Once the U.S. decided to
defend South Korea, it would be increasingly difficult to explain why
Taiwan should not also be defended. If the Chinese Communists at
tacked the island and simultaneously interfered with the defense of
South Korea, the Truman administration would be terribly vulnerable
to attacks from Chiang’s supporters in the U.S. When Chinese forces
eventually became involved in the conflict, U.S. opposition to Mao’s
regime hardened and simultaneously widened the circle of Americans
who sought Chiang’s return to power.
As the climate of anticommunist ardor increased in the U.S.,
Senate hearings were held in April of 1950 to investigate Senator
Joseph McCarthy’s accusations that State Department officials and
some experts on China had been involved in a pro-communist conspir
acy to influence the Truman administration’s China policy. Popular
ized during the Senate hearings, the term “China Lobby” came into use
at this time. The phrase gained greater prominence in June and July
1951, during the Senate hearings on Truman’s removal of General
Douglas MacArthur from his command in Korea. The subject of the
China Lobby was introduced because MacArthur argued, in line with
the China Lobby’s charges, that General George Marshall’s mission to
China in 1945-1946 had been “one of the greatest blunders in Ameri
can history.”9 Pro-Chiang forces had criticized Marshall for having
attempted to force Chiang into a political alliance with the
Communists, and later, as Secretary of State, for having allegedly sabo
taged U.S. aid to Chiang, therefore guaranteeing the “loss” of China to
the Communists. Secretary of State Dean Acheson countered
MacArthur’s allegations by announcing that Truman had instructed all
relevant government agencies to investigate the activities of the China
Lobby.10
In support of Acheson, Oregon Senator Wayne Morse asserted
that “the China Lobby,” or the group supporting Chiang Kai-shek, had
9
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“for several years been conducting a violent campaign against American
policies in China”11 Alfred Kohlberg, retorted, “The real ‘China Lobby’
is the pro-Communist lobby within the State Department.”12 In re
sponse to the investigation, pro-Chiang forces denounced Acheson and
demanded an investigation of “pro-Communist” China lobbies within
the administration.
The congressional investigation of the China Lobby led by Senator
Morse and others produced less than substantial findings. The probe
had unearthed little in terms of concrete information about the opera
tion of the Lobby despite clear indications that a substantial amount of
money, largely from undisclosed sources, had been expended for a proNationalist publicity and propaganda campaign and that a very close
connection existed between the campaign and “certain politicians and
public figures.”13 In the meantime, China Lobby forces, galvanized by
the heightened voice among anti-Communist crusaders in Congress
during the Korean War, intensified their efforts to discredit the
administration’s China policy and to advocate continuing support of
Chiang. Indeed, in the fierce anti-Communist climate of the time, the
Lobby’s message found wide support, and critics of the Lobby exposed
themselves to harsh censure from pro-Chiang advocates.
A major characteristic of the China Lobby was the way it propa
gated its arguments to the public. Indeed, the China Lobby became
controversial for its extraordinary ability to discredit State Department
officials and others for “betrayal” and “treason.” In historian Ross
Koen’s view, “the China lobby was so successful in securing [public]
acceptance of its explanation of America’s role in the Far East…because
its propaganda exploited…the absence of an informed understanding of
events in China”14 Such tactics appeared to have swayed a wide variety
of Americans against the U.S. government’s policies toward China by
11
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effectively utilizing propaganda that identified Chiang’s regime with
American ideals and contended that Americans had a special responsi
bility for China’s development.
One of the ways that the China Lobby influenced public opinion
and pressured foreign policy decisions regarding China was to form
committees. The most active of these committees was the ACPA. From
its creation in the 1940s until 1953, the ACPA published a tremendous
volume of literature in the form of letters, pamphlets, brochures, re
prints of Communist directives, press releases, and book reviews.15
Most of these were prepared and published in the office of Alfred
Kohlberg, who tirelessly advocated the China Lobby’s agenda through
the efforts of the ACPA. Among the other influential committees were
the China Emergency Committee and the Committee to Defend
America by Aiding Anti-Communist.16 Not surprisingly, these various
committees consisted of a similar membership. Thus, to a large degree,
these committees’ agendas blurred together, and they coordinated their
efforts to achieve the most widespread effect on public opinion and
foreign policy decisions.
Another committee that efficiently swayed foreign policy decisions
regarding China was the Committee of One Million. The idea of the
committee was conceived in October 1953 by Marvin Liebman, in
partnership with Senator Walter Judd and Count Nicolas De Roche
fort, with the intention of initiating a petition listing eight reasons
opposing Communist China to the United Nations. The petition
would be presented to a broad list of VIP’s in Congress, Republicans
and Democrats alike, with the goal of giving the petition legitimacy
when it was published in a newspaper advertisement to solicit more
signatures.
Among the more prominent members to sign the initial petition
were former President Herbert Hoover and former Ambassador Joseph
C. Grewt. Eventually garnering over one million signatures—hence the
Committee of One Million—the petition’s signers included: forty-nine
members of Congress (twenty-three of whom were Democrats), twelve
15
16
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governors, twenty retired generals and admirals (including General
George C. Marshall), fourteen prominent religious leaders, and numer
ous scientists, educators, and business leaders.17 The New York Times
reported at the time that New York’s four most prominent veteran’s
organizations were mobilizing to collect signatures for the petition.
According to the petitions spokesman, it was “a protest against the
indignities to which those Chinese have been subjected by the ugly
dogma and practice of international Communist imperialism.”18 At the
collection of the millionth signature, the petition was presented to
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who received the initial signatories in
the White House and allowed Judd to make his case for denying the
Communist China membership in the United Nations. It is difficult to
assess how effective the petition was on President Eisenhower, yet at a
news conference on July 7, 1953 Eisenhower announced that he would
oppose Communist China’s admittance to the UN.19 In this instance, it
does not seem unreasonable to speculate that the China Lobby did in
deed help to sway foreign policy decisions concerning China.
Another means by which the China Lobby sought to influence
foreign policy was through the media, undoubtedly one of the most
efficient ways to disseminate propaganda. Alfred Kohlberg alone subsi
dized the pro-Chiang magazines The China Monthly and Plain Talk as
outlets to denounce United States policy in China. Articles from The
China Monthly frequently found their way into the congressional re
cord, and the magazine has been cited as a source of China Lobby
propaganda in congressional hearings.20 Moreover, The China Monthly
frequently served as the major organ for the dissemination of the views
of Americans associated with the China Lobby. In fact, neither maga
zine served not as a financially viable business, they were primarily
mouthpieces for the diffusion of propaganda critical of U.S. foreign
policy toward China.
17
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A number of other influential publications also helped to advocate
the agenda of the Chinese National Government and the China Lobby.
Foremost among these publications were Collier’s, The Saturday
Evening Post, Readers Digest, U.S. News and World Report, and both
Time and Life newsmagazines.21 Additionally, newspapers such as The
Washington Times-Herald, the Los Angeles Examiner, the San Francisco
Examiner, and the Oakland Tribune were also consistent in their criti
cism of U.S. policy and in their defense of the Chinese Nationalist
cause.22 As the anticommunist climate grew in the U.S. during the dec
ade of the 1950s, the tendency for the press to accept the viewpoint of
the China Lobby also expanded. By the mid-1950s the prevalence of
the China Lobby influenced bias in the press was near universal.
For example, Chiang’s most influential American friend, Henry
Luce, turned Time and Life newsmagazines into advocates for the Chi
nese Nationalist Party. A fiercely partisan Republican, Luce readily
blamed Democrats of denying Chiang essential aid and portrayed the
Nationalists as an anticommunist bulwark. These concerns, combined
with his aspirations for a U.S.-influenced China, led him into a loose
affiliation of pro-Chiang advocates, later called the China Lobby. Luce
became one of the more prominent members of the Lobby’s associates,
both due to his wealth and prominence, as well as for his proficiency at
disseminating pro-Chiang propaganda to the American public. Using
Time Inc.’s media outlets—including its magazines, films, and radio
programs—Luce conveyed his conception of a China advancing under
Chiang’s leadership with U.S. patronage. The exact number of copies of
Time and Life that were sold during this period is uncertain, but by
biographer W.A. Swanberg’s estimate, Luce stood guilty of “manipu
lating 50 million people weekly.”23
Another aspect of the use of media to disseminate pro-Chiang
propaganda and change U.S. policy towards China was the effort to
discredit Far Eastern experts who did not continue to embrace the
21
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Nationalist cause after the Communist victory. After Chiang’s defeat,
such Far Eastern experts had come to believe that the Chinese Revolu
tion had run its course and the future of mainland China no longer
involved Chiang as an eventual leader. These experts constituted a small
number of individuals and tended to maintain close ties and associa
tions. Partly due to this intimacy, the close association of the Far
Eastern experts tended to create the impression of unanimity on China
policy, which substantially increased the impact of these scholars’ views
on the American public.
Due to this apparent accord amongst the small group of Far
Eastern experts, the China Lobby set about to discredit this prevailing
school of thought. To this end, Lobby members began to levy the
charge that China specialists had expressed a lack of belief in Chiang, a
conviction in the ultimate triumph of the Communists, and had ulti
mately contributed to Mao’s victory. In the context of the growing
anticommunist climate in the United States, this accusation allowed
the China Lobby to make an effective case for its attack on U.S. foreign
policy. Accusations involving Communist sympathy and the use of
Communist sources were therefore adopted early on in the attempt to
discredit China specialists that were not pro-Chiang.
As these attacks were being written and published, they also began
to gain public exposure through the congressional investigation of
Owen Lattimore. Lattimore was a well-known Far Eastern specialist
and writer who had traveled extensively in China and was generally
recognized amongst scholars as an expert on the interior areas of China
and Mongolia. He was also an ideal target for the China Lobby. By
damaging Lattimore’s reputation and his legitimacy as a Far Eastern
scholar, the China Lobby could more effectively advocate the viewpoint
of a pro-Chiang U.S. policy to the American public. By voicing a proChiang U.S. policy through the outlet of scholarly expertise, the China
Lobby could go a long way in promoting their agenda.
The China Lobby’s attack on Owen Lattimore may have begun
primarily because of Alfred Kohlberg’s unsuccessful attempt to gain
control over the Institute for Pacific Relations. The campaign to dis
credit Lattimore continued for nearly five years, carried on primarily
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through Kohlberg’s publications of Plain Talk and The China
Monthly.24 In early 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy presented a com
plete compilation of all the attacks previously levied on Lattimore by
Kohlberg. These charges made national headlines and focused on
Lattimore as the central player.
The New York Times, for example, described Lattimore as “the top
Russian espionage agent in this country,” and claimed that he was
“dragged by the heels into a Senate subcommittee inves
tigating…charges of communism in the State Department.”25 Lattimore
spent thirteen days testifying before the subcommittee refuting the
committee’s accusations that his writings had been used to further the
cause of the Soviet Union. Without ample evidence to support their
claims, the committee recommended that the Department of Justice
charge Lattimore with perjury. Although the charge was formalized by
the Department of Justice, the court threw out key components of the
indictment on the grounds of their vagueness and eventually dismissed
the indictment. The New York Times offered their take on Lattimore’s
trial: “Mr. Lattimore’s real offense was that he had come to differ
sharply with something he calls ‘the China Lobby.’”26 Although
Lattimore escaped further prosecution, the original purpose of the at
tack was accomplished: the widespread publicity given to the
accusations against had damaged his reputation. Scholars associated
with him also became more vulnerable to accusations of Communist
affiliation by the associates of the Lobby. Moreover, objective informa
tion regarding China policy was diminished while pro-Chiang
propaganda was accentuated.
The encompassing effects of the China Lobby on U.S. foreign
policy toward China are difficult to gauge. To a certain extent the
China Lobby’s views seem to have become widely accepted due to the
anti-Communist climate in the U.S. during the early 1950s, and the
effectiveness of the Lobby’s propaganda efforts. The Lobby was also
24
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highly successful in disseminating the view that anti-Chiang sentiment
meant disloyalty to the United States. The Lobby’s propaganda unques
tionably damaged the reputations of scholars, journalists, and
politicians alike. The widely assorted and loosely affiliated China Lobby
membership effectively used their political connections and media
propaganda to channel their views. Lobby propaganda also fanned the
flames of the growing anticommunist climate in the U.S., helping to
create a political environment where their agenda would be more
acceptable to the American public.
The political pressure that the China Lobby could bring to bear
during the early 1950s should not be underestimated. As Michael
Schaller states, “by the late 1950s, despite a broad agreement on the
need to revisit [China] policy, few politicians were prepared to take the
heat from the China Lobby.”27 The China Lobby and its allies, but
tressed by the Republican Party, were able to aggressively argue for their
cause and to intimidate those that might express contrary viewpoints.
Exemplified through the well-known McCarthy hearings, the penalty
for opposing the anticommunist crusaders and their China Lobby allies
could be severe. However it is fair to say that despite the zeal of
McCarthy and men like him, many of Chiang’s most ardent supporters
actually cared little about China one way or the other, and only found it
a useful issue to advance their personal political agendas. Although the
China Lobby held significant sway over U.S. foreign policy—and had
thus far prevented the formal recognition of the PRC—Chiang Kai
shek was no closer to regaining the China mainland than he had been
since his expulsion by Mao in 1949.
In this regard, the China Lobby achieved mix results in obtaining
their long term goals: Chiang Kai-shek had not “retaken” mainland
China, but Taiwan had also not been overrun by the PRC. And,
although the United States provided the military support necessary to
prevent a Communist invasion of Taiwan (which had seemed immi
nent after the Communist government shelled the nearby islands of
Quemoy and Matsu in 1954), the U.S. had also increasingly advocated a
27
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“two China policy” that recognized both the Communist and
Nationalist governments. Moreover, even though Taiwan became
incorporated into the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, severe
limitations were imposed on Chiang’s ability to initiate aggression
against the PRC. In fact, Taiwan’s incorporation into SEATO, was
accompanied not only Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ demand
that Chiang “stop telling his people that their return to the mainland
was imminent,” but also by the notice that the U.S. would refuse by its
Security Council veto power should the United Nations voted to seat
the PRC.28
In the following years, as Lobby members realized that mainland
China had been definitively lost to the PRC, support of Taiwan would
come to be the focal point of the Lobby’s efforts. With the relationship
of the PRC and the United States in a mutually suspicious state of
limbo after 1955, the China Lobby continued to rally for proNationalist causes and the denial of UN recognition for the PRC.
Nonetheless, from 1949 to 1955, the China Lobby unquestionably held
significant sway over public and political perception on the United
States’ China policy, and therefore, significantly influenced policy
developments. Indeed, it can only be speculated how much effect China
Lobby pressure had on politicians and the policies that they rendered.
Although the China Lobby ultimately failed in its goal of returning
Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government to power in China, it
is nevertheless important to note that it would be nearly twenty years
before the PRC would finally gain admittance to the United Nations.
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SEEING PENNSYL VANIA AS THE KEYSTONE
OF THE REVOLUTION: CHARLES H. LINCOLN’S
TREATMENT OF ETHNICITY
By Greg Rogers
Charles H. Lincoln’s 1901 The Revolutionary Movement in
Pennsylvania 1760-1776 is an insightful examination of the internal
politics of a state often overshadowed by Massachusetts and Virginia in
studies on the roots of the American Revolution. In addition to being a
valuable secondary source, Lincoln’s monograph can also be read as a
primary source, specifically with regard to the issue of ethnicity.
Lincoln’s argument relies heavily upon a particular conception of
ethnicity, wherein ethnic identity, shaped by shared past experiences,
influences the actions and interests of historical actors. This formula
tion of ethnicity and its importance can be attributed, in part, to the
monograph’s focus on Pennsylvania, the most culturally heterogeneous
of Britain’s North American colonies. However, the influence of
progressive historiography, and the Progressive Era in general, distinctly
shape both Lincoln’s focus and his thesis regarding the origins of the
Revolution. The concept of ethnicity, as fashioned by the author’s so
cial and intellectual surroundings, greatly affected Lincoln’s analysis of
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Pennsylvania’s internal conflicts and their connection to the American
Revolution as a whole.
Lincoln’s study begins with a thorough analysis of the roots of
Pennsylvania’s “internal” revolutionary movement by highlighting the
ethnic, sectional, religious, and geographic differences that led to a fis
sure between the ruling Quaker elite and the marginalized immigrants,
urban workers, and western settlers that were growing in size and influ
ence. Following this, Lincoln examines the consolidation of political
factions into parties, which culminated in the demise of Quaker
hegemony in Pennsylvania in the elections of 1775 and 1776, thus
replacing the old order while simultaneously endorsing “the assertion of
national independence.”1 The presence of such interrelated contests is
the foundation of the so-called “dual-revolution thesis,” in which
revolution was directed against both an external agent (Britain) and
against forces within the colony itself. This thesis was a key component
of Progressive Era historiography. Lincoln’s articulation of this thesis
predates the better-known, but arguably weaker, version made by Carl
Becker in The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York,
1760-1776, and is distinguished from Becker’s account—and the gen
eral body of Progressive-Era literature on the Revolution—in its
treatment of ethnicity. In Lincoln’s work, the role of different ethnic
groups and their grievances is a key component to understanding the
internal revolt.2
In The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania, these ethnic
groups are treated as distinct political blocs. For Lincoln, ethnic iden
tity serves as a determining factor for both economic interest and politi
cal culture. Given the centrality of ethnicity to his study, it is vital to
have an understanding of what he means by invoking the term “race.”
For Lincoln, ethnic groups are shaped not by their biolog y or by some
“instilled ethnic spirit,” but are instead the product of their unique his
torical experience in the Old and New World.
1
Charles H. Lincoln, The Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania 1760-1777
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1901), 234.
2
Robert Gough, “Charles H. Lincoln, Carl Becker, and the Origins of the DualRevolution Thesis,” William and Mary Quarterly 38, no. 1 ( Jan. 1981): 97-98.
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Lincoln addresses three major political blocs: the Germans, the
Scotch-Irish, and the English Quakers. In Lincoln’s work, the Germans
are endowed with a political culture characterized by an overriding dis
trust for all government, be it imperial, colonial, or local. These
misgivings were based upon their past experience in various German
states, England, colonial New York, and, eventually, in Pennsylvania
itself—experiences that were retained in ethnic memory. Furthermore,
they display no affinity or ties to traditional English political ideas. As a
result, they prefer to be left alone and typically serve as a passive ally to
either the Quakers or Scotch-Irish when they engage in politics. As
revolutionary thought and action took center stage, however, Lincoln
argues that the “race as a whole” embraced the cause of independence
because they lacked “ties of blood” to England and were offered politi
cal equality.3
Like the Germans, the Scotch-Irish are also treated as a dissenting
ethnic community. According to Lincoln, two centuries of experience
with the English and the settlement of Ireland gave rise to a serious
interest in politics, a “fierce” desire to protect their rights, and “confi
dence in the principles of democracy.”4 Additionally, their history with
the Gaelic Irish was viewed as influential in their dealings with Native
American populations in Pennsylvania’s western frontier, providing the
basis for their assertion that the land was theirs to settle by the laws of
God. The Scotch-Irish that had settled Ulster County, Ireland through
out the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries cared little for the
Catholic Irish that they were expropriating land from and viewed them
as backward savages. Native Americans thus played a role similar to that
of the Gaelic Irish as the Scotch-Irish transplanted their religious
justification for settlement across the Atlantic. It is in the Scotch-Irish
that Lincoln locates the “spirit of colonial resistance to England.”5
The English Quakers are the last group dealt with in detail by
Lincoln. In short, Lincoln contends that, despite their minority relig
ious affiliation, the Quakers were representative of the British ruling
3

Lincoln, 24-27, 31-32, 36.
Ibid., 32.
5
Ibid., 32-36.
4
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classes that the American Revolution ultimately sought to overthrow.
Therefore, the Quakers were a stark English foil to the aforementioned
ethnic groups.
In addition to dealing with ethnic groups as distinct units,
Lincoln’s concern with ethnicity also results in an interest in immigra
tion. The explosion of German and Scotch-Irish immigration after the
second decade of the eighteenth century is depicted in a political con
text. Having arrived first and established the structure of the colonial
government, the Quakers understandably were concerned about chang
ing demographic trends. Lincoln sees the emerging power struggle as a
game of numbers—one in which the ruling elite were forced to watch
their own population become eclipsed by the influx of new immigrants.
In the face of this irreversible trend, the Quakers sought to maintain
political control, and did so until the mid-1770s. The relationship
between immigration and control over the colony politicized the issue
of immigration so that it became a point of contention between the
later proprietors and the colonial legislature. While William Penn was
wary of an “open door” policy, later proprietors, motivated by economic
gains from land sales, had much fewer qualms about inviting a wide
variety of immigrants into the colony.6
Although Lincoln placed a great deal of emphasis on ethnic iden
tity, it was not necessarily the supreme factor in his study. Economic
interests, religion, regionalism, and class differences were also present in
his analysis. Nevertheless, Lincoln often connected these other factors
to issues of ethnicity. For instance, he argues that the concerns of the
frontier were not wholly shaped by geography and security, but were
also influenced by the fact that those living in the frontier region were
overwhelmingly German and Scotch-Irish—a consequence of the fact
that the Quakers had intentionally encouraged the settlement of these
groups away from Philadelphia in order to marginalize their influence
and provide a buffer against the occasionally hostile Native American
tribes.7 Lincoln also connects ethnicity to economic concerns. For in
stance, Lincoln argues that German and Scotch-Irish affinity for the
6
7

Ibid., 33-36, 80.
Ibid., 34.
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colony of Maryland and its center of trade in Baltimore can be credited
to the similar ethnic heritage between residents of Maryland the new
immigrants to the north. Sharing a similar ethnic background, these
groups became “racially united,” resulting in close trading ties. This
shift in economic and even political allegiance contributed to the fric
tion between Philadelphia and its outlying communities.8
There are three primary factors that can shed light on Lincoln’s
perspective on ethnicity: (1) his focus on Pennsylvania, (2) trends
within Progressive scholarship, and (3) the influence of the Progressive
Era in general. Any scholar with at least a passing interest in the Ameri
can Revolution and colonial America cannot help but notice the
striking ethnic diversity within Pennsylvania during the eighteenth
century. More than any of the other thirteen colonies, Pennsylvania was
characterized by ethnic pluralism. By 1750, the English Quakers ac
counted for only one-third of the population—a number roughly equal
to the number of Scotch-Irish in Pennsylvania. The German segment
had grown to constitute about 40 percent of the total. In addition,
there were small but visible communities of Welsh, Swedish, Dutch,
and Scottish colonists. Since the English were least numerous in the
middle colonies, particularly in Pennsylvania, these areas were most ripe
for ethnic studies.9 Pennsylvania also lends itself to the type of ethnicpolitical blocs put forward by Lincoln because of the nature of its
political contests. While familial groups or loosely defined factions
dominated other colonies, Pennsylvania had perhaps the clearest
instance of party politics. This structure, paired with the existence of a
clearly English elite and a non-English periphery, are the essential
components that underlie Lincoln’s advancement of the dualrevolution thesis.10
Beyond the particularities of his subject matter, developing trends
among Progressive Era historians also influenced Lincoln’s handling of
ethnicity. Over the course of the nineteenth century, historians began
8

Ibid., 55, 75-76.
Alan Taylor, American Colonies: The Settling of North America (New York:
Peng uin, 2001), 271-272, 321.
10
Alan W. Tully, “Ethnicity, Relig ion, and Politics in Early America,” The
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biog raphy 107, no. 4 (Oct. 1983): 493-494.
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to expand their conception of who constituted the American people.
No longer limited to Protestant Anglo-Americans, the works of
scholars like Frederick Jackson Turner and Charles Beard began to
draw attention to other ethnic groups. While this movement did not
fully materialize until after the First World War, Lincoln and his
contemporaries, writing in the late 1800s and early 1900s, can be seen
as its forerunners.11 This is evidenced in his sources for the chapter
“The Influence of German and Irish Immig ration.” He utilizes a
plethora of works, almost all written in the 1890s, that are ethnic
histories of the two groups in question. This is a strong testament to the
vitality of ethnic studies in the early progressive period.12
This shift in historical interest was at least partially influenced by
contemporary events taking place during the progressive era. Between
1890 and 1893 alone, there was an annual influx of about half a million
immigrants. This new wave of immigration consisted primarily of Slavs,
Italians, Russians, and Jews—groups that were culturally and politically
quite different from the “old immigrants” of a century before. These
differences caused a vocal and powerful backlash of nativism.13
Whether or not progressive historians were concerned with colonial
immigration and ethnicity because of their nativist leanings or because
of their hopes for the infusion of new diversity is an area that remains to
be explored. Regardless, ethnicity and immigration were certainly
salient issues of the time. Lincoln’s discussions of the debates
surrounding the Pennsylvania colony’s immigration policy clearly
parallel those taking place in the United States Congress. Questions
concerning an open door policy versus a more restrictive approach were
not just the milieu of the past—they were also present in Lincoln’s
world. Philadelphia, the city where he worked on his PhD and pub
lished The Revolutionary Movement, was a minor port of entry for
immigrants and, more importantly, “an immigrant city.” Between the
years of 1900 and 1920 the population of those coming from ethnic
11
John Higham, History: Professional Scholarship in America (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1989), 191-192.
12
Lincoln, 23.
13
Faith Jaycox, The Progressive Era, (New York: Facts on File, 2005), 7, 30-31.
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groups considered being ‘new’ immigrants nearly quadrupled from at
least 60,000 to well over 200,000.14 The Pennsylvania of 1901 was
clearly involved in an ethnic influx with political and demographic
consequences not dissimilar to those of the Pennsylvania of 1750.
To some degree, all works of history are a product of their author’s
environment. A historian’s surroundings shape and direct an analysis
just as much as his or her theoretical inclinations. Written in another
time, or about another place, Lincoln’s The Revolutionary Movement in
Pennsylvania would have been a significantly different work. His dis
tinct view and emphasis on ethnicity and the related issue of immi
gration not only shape of his thematic content but also his argument.
The colony is presented as a model of the British Empire in
“miniature.” It is a heterogeneous collection of religions, regions, eco
nomic interests, and ethnicities or “races.” It is ethnicity, constructed by
Lincoln as political-economic blocs, that usually transcends these other
concerns. Far from being an obstacle, this diversity actually
strengthened democracy as different groups had to unite and cooperate
in order to overthrow ruling elites, Quaker or imperial. “Disunity” was
an “excellent foundation for revolt.”15 Whether or not Pennsylvania
and Progressive Era thinking present a skewed and inaccurate account
of the American Revolution is open to debate. What is certain is that
factors of contemporary time and provincial place are just as evident in
Lincoln’s text as the broader thesis he pioneered.

14
Frederic M. Miller, “Immigration Throug h the Port of Philadelphia,” in
Forgotten Doors: The Other Ports of Entry to the United States, ed. M. Mark Stolarik
(Philadelphia: Balch Institute Press, 1988), 37, 48.
15
Lincoln, 3,13, 53-54, 114, 189.
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READING BETWEEN THE L AWS:
LITERARY REPRESEN TATIONS OF THE
FRENCH HOMOSEXUAL, 1942-1981
By Alison Veith
On August 4, 1942, the Vichy government under Marshal Philippe
Pétain passed an ordinance declaring that the age of sexual consent for
homosexuals would be twenty-one, while the age of consent for hetero
sexuals would remain at thirteen.1 As the first legal penalization of
sodomy in the history of the French Republic, this ordinance remained
in the penal code for decades after the fall of the Vichy government and
France’s liberation in 1945. The law’s restrictive nature over homo
sexual acts was further compounded by the subsequent legislation of
July 30, 1960, which authorized the government and police to take “all
measures necessary to fight against homosexuality.”2 These measures
focused on prosecuting public acts of indecency and again marked a
1
Scott Gunther, The Elastic Closet : A History of Homosexuality in France, 1942
Present (New York: Palg rave Macmillan, 2009), 26.
2
Georges Sidéris, “Folles, Swells, Effeminates, and Homophiles in Saint-Germain
des-Prés of the 1950s: A New ‘Precious’ Society?” in Homosexuality in French History and
Culture, e d. Jeffrey Merrick and Michael Sibalis, 219-232 (New York: Haworth Press,
2001), 226.
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blatant discrepancy between the treatment of heterosexual and homo
sexual participants. Homosexuals caught and prosecuted for sexual acts
in public faced double the penalty of heterosexuals prosecuted for the
same crime: six months to four years in prison and a fine ranging from
1,000 to 15,000 francs.3 Although neither law went so far as to make
sodomy a criminal act—as was the case in Great Britain and the United
States—these restrictions are still unique within their French context,
as they legally defined homosexual acts as separate and more punishable
than similar heterosexual acts.4 Lasting nearly forty years (1942-1981),
this period of blatant legislative oppression of homosexuals imposed
discretion and invisibility on the male homosexual community. Lacking
acceptable outlets for expression, much of their activity was confined to
sexual gratification and anonymous encounters.5
It is only within the last decade that history, sociology, and “queer
theory” scholars have genuinely begun to delve into the complexities of
the French homosexual by considering the intersections of national
identity, self-definition, and lived physical space. Although there is reti
cence to explicitly pinpoint any single universal marker of “homosexual
identity,” even within the narrowed scope of twentieth-century France,
three scholarly frameworks are commonly used to discuss the French
homosexual male: (1) how he is regarded in relationship to his unique
French national context; (2) how homosexuality relates to the more
abstract theories of postmodernism and structuralism; and (3) how the
physical space of Paris has defined him.
To best understand the French homosexual, many scholars focus
their attention on trying to articulate the relationship between sexual
identity and French citizenship, recognizing immediately that these two
personal identities must coexist in some way. Edna McCaffrey and
3

Gunther, 37.
The nature of the French Republic is to never de viate from their shared French
identity, thus it is sig nificant that homosexuals became leg islatively isolated, as it is a
blaring distinction in the French legislative context.
5
This essay places two immediate limiting factors on the discussion of French
homosexuality. The first is that the history of the homosexual will be limited to post
1942, focusing on life under the law’s restrictions. The second is that this paper will focus
only on male homosexuals due to a lack of literature and discussion of lesbian visibility
during the chosen period.
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Dennis Provencher focus most on the significance of French national
identity, which has its roots in the French Revolution’s rallying cry,
“liberté, egalité, fraternité.” McCaffrey notes that these values of liberty,
equality, and brotherhood are so engrained in the French republic that
French citizenship, by definition, emulates this continued spirit of eq
uality among its citizens. For example, French legislation provides free
and equal access to health care and education for all of its citizens. And
although these rights are guaranteed to all French people simply by
virtue of their nationality, McCaffrey argues that one negative of this
political ideolog y is that it ignores or is indifferent to potential varia
tions of need among French individuals.6 In Queer French, Denis
Provencher explains the implications of this ideolog y for French homo
sexuality. Because the French government focuses only on universal
rights, it does not protect or embrace mobilization of specific group and
identity politics.7 For this reason, Provencher notes that French
homosexuals in the modern context seem to resist community
mobilization and identification with the familiar discourses of “queer”
and “pride.” Unlike in the United States, where these words embody
empowerment and activism, they mean very little in France—French
homosexuals live in a political system that values similarity over
difference, and provides equal protections, not specific ones. For
Provencher and other scholars, this distinction is critical for
understanding the French homosexual. True, a man may be gay, but he
does not identify with a “gay community,” and this gay community does
not receive specific political rights. Instead, he is first and foremost a
French citizen, benefiting from the political protections of his
citizenship only.
Focusing exclusively on the French homosexual’s national identity,
however, ignores the significant influence of the twentieth century’s
intellectual restructuring on the legitimization of homosexuality. For
example, postmodernism and structuralism paved the way for theories
6
Edna Mc Caffrey, The Gay Republic : Sexuality, Citizenship and Subversion in
France ( Vermont: Ashgate, 2005), 34.
7
Denis Provencher, Queer French: Globalization, Language, and Sexual Citizenship
in France ( Vermont: Ashgate, 2007), 5.
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that recognize and embrace all aspects of identity as socially constructed
and fluctuating. Although not engaging specifically in these theoretical
discussions, Florence Tamagne alludes to identity politics when he
traces the historical emergence of the word “homosexual” as a signifier
for a person rather than a sexual act. Appearing in the medical discourse
of the late 1890s and the psychoanalytic work of Sigmund Freud and
other early psychotherapists, this is the first time homosexuality is de
fined as a state of being. Despite “medically” defining homosexuals as ill
or psychologically deficient in comparison to the heterosexual norm,
these psychoanalytic observations were the first to recognize homo
sexuality as originating in the mind of a person. Rather than existing
only as external sexual acts and experimentation, homosexual incli
nations were now internal. For Tamagne, this is significant for the
eventual formation of the homosexual identity.8 Once homosexuality
becomes a legitimate condition of an individual, it is able to become an
identity that can be embraced and harnessed. Following Tamagne’s
lead, other scholars point to the emerging theories of postmodernism
and structuralism as affording homosexuals further opportunity to selfdefine and mobilize around new types of rhetoric, which more generally
sought to re-imagine identity and human purpose post World War II.
The scholar that pushed the limits of these emerging theories the
most has been Michel Foucault, a French-homosexual philosopher,
sociologist, and historian who, interestingly, in complete commitment
to his identity theories, denied his own sexuality up until his death.
Regarded as the father of queer theory, Foucault believed that
homosexuality had the unique ability to push the boundaries of sexual
identity and expression. Like most of his philosophy, Foucault viewed
sexuality as a socially constructed system of power and hierarchy, in this
instance as artificially dictated by heterosexual norms. Conversely, he
viewed homosexuality as outside of, and free from, this hierarchy, pre
cisely because it was not accepted as “normal.” Moreover, because
homosexuality was not a “set” existence defined by the existing social
schema—but was, instead, still in a state of becoming—it offered a criti
8
Florence, Tamagne, A History of Homosexuality in Europe: Berlin, London, Paris,
1919-1939, 2 vols. (New York: Algora, 2006), 151-163.
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cal and necessary avenue for all human beings to resist the constructed
sexual hierarchy that dominated, and artificially labeled, all sexualities.
Thus, for Foucault, recognizing homosexuality as legitimate effectively
re-imagines culture as an environment in which all desires can co-exist
devoid of power structures.9
Although Foucault’s three-volume work, The History of Sexuality,
is a well-respected historical and theoretical discussion of sexuality and
identity politics, his highly abstract representation of homosexuality
becomes an act of reticence in itself. His continual deconstruction of
identity leaves only indiscernible fragments that resist not just
homosexual identification, but all identification. Thus, it is difficult to
utilize Foucault’s theories to better understand and explain the French
homosexual identity.
Many scholars, however, have found the postmodernist theorist
Roland Barthes—best known for his work on semiotics and signs—to
be useful for bridging the gap between homosexual theory and lived
experience. Rather than focus on deconstructing identity like Foucault,
Barthes identifies the unstated signs that make up the physical spaces
we live in and examines how these signs correspond with, and dictate
how, we operate in those spaces. His theory suggests a symbiotic
relationship between space and people, wherein each naturally mirrors
the othe r. Like Foucault, this is also highly theoretical, but Barthes’s
arguments in “Semiology and the Urban” are particularly useful for our
exploration of the French homosexual. In “Semiology and the Urban,”
he argues that the urban city is “felt as the place of exchange of social
activities and…erotic activities in the broadest sense of the word. Better
still, the city center is always felt as the space where subversive forces,
forces of rupture, [and] forces act and meet.”10 For Barthes, urban space
facilitates the needs of our internal erotic. Although not limited
explicitly to sexual intimacy, the “urban” is the unique physical land
scape that, by its very nature, mirrors our internal landscape of desires.
9
Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972
1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Random House, 1980), 21-22.
10
Roland Barthes, “Semiolog y and the Urban,” in The City and the Sign: An
Introduction to Urban Semiotics, e d. Mark Gottdiener and Alexandros Ph Lag opoulos, 87
98 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 96
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Expanding on Barthes’s theoretical work on urban gratification,
historians like Michael Sibalis seek to understand the French homosex
ual through his relationship with the Parisian urban. This framework,
however, is also problematic, as it becomes a limited exploration of
French homosexual identity merely in terms of the pursuit and fulfill
ment of sexual gratification within Paris. For example, Sibalis addresses
both the historical and contemporary reality of the French homosexual
by charting the development of his sexual expression and his emerging
identity as it is linked to the changing ways he has utilized Parisian ur
ban spaces. As Sibalis notes, public parks, quays along the Seine, and
even street urinals have historically been spots for “cruising” and anony
mous sexual encounters.11 Along with these public spaces, private bars,
backrooms, and saunas of the 1950s also emerged as known places for
sexual gratification. Again, though, there is reticence for scholars to
fully embrace this framework as definitive of French homosexuality
because it borders on oversimplification. Not only does it ignore the
French homosexual experience outside of Paris, but it also dangerously
regresses towards defining sexual identity in terms of acts and not being,
the perspective held before the breakthroughs of twentieth century
psychoanalytical discourse.
Despite the fact that this historical framework may oversimplify
French homosexuality by focusing too much on these sexual encoun
ters, due to the laws, this was the homosexual experience between 1942
and 1981. However, by analyzing these same encounters through
literature, the complexities of the French homosexual participating in
these sex acts becomes more discernable to the reader. Literature is able
to synthesize the historical, cultural, and personal in one common space
as it attempts to emulate the complex reality of lived experience. Thus,
to better understand the French homosexual’s lived reality under the
laws, this essay will analyze literature written about homosexual men in
Paris during this time period. Focusing on American writer James
Baldwin and French writer Jean Genet, two self-identified gay men who
both lived and wrote in Paris during this time, this essay will also
11
Michael D. Sibalis, “Paris” in Gay Urban Histories Since 1600, e d. David Higgs,
10-37 (London: Routle dge, 1999), 16
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highlight the cultural differences between American and French views
of sexuality. Put succinctly, Baldwin’s presentation seems shaped by
America’s conservative tendency to “talk around sex,” whereas Genet is
most decidedly French in his direct verbalization of the sexual act itself.
Although both authors focus on sexual gratification and fleeting
encounters amidst the Parisian backdrop, each author’s national and
cultural perspective inevitably frames his depiction of these encounters,
and his understanding of their French participants.
From an American perspective, expatriate writer James Baldwin is
the most credible source from which to evaluate French homosexuality
during the middle of the twentieth century. As a homosexual who spent
most of his life in Paris after 1950, Baldwin’s personal experiences in
form his fiction’s depiction of French homosexuality. His novel,
Giovanni’s Room, published in 1956, focuses explicitly on homosexuals
in Paris through the internal struggles of its American protagonist,
David. Following David’s struggle in choosing between loving his
female fiancée, Hella, and the young , virulent homosexual barman,
Giovanni, this text offers an accessible commentary of French homo
sexuality in the 1950s. Moreover, as an American, David’s perspective
facilitates a comparison of American and French cultural views of
sexuality.
When David first meets Giovanni at a fictional bar on Paris’s Left
Bank, Baldwin’s description of the scene not only highlights the reality
of the 1942 law being enforced, but also suggests the undertones of
sexual gratification motivating the bar’s homosexual patrons.12 Al
though fictional, the bar is located in the sixth arrondissement, and
represents the emerging homosexual establishments of the Saint
Germain-des-Prés area.13 David’s narration also suggests the very real
presence of police raids during the period. He describes how Guillaume,
the bar’s owner, always seemed knowledgeable enough to successfully
warn his favorite patrons which nights were best to “stay at home.”14
David’s observation of the bar’s patrons highlights two “types” of
12
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homosexuals that were quite common in the contemporary Parisian
homosexual community. For David (and Baldwin), both of these
“types” play a specific role in the sexual encounter. Both Guillaume and
Jacques, David’s friend, are described as older and well dressed, yet
noticeably lacking the virility of youth. These two men play the role of
the established, older pederast—the pursuer of younger males. Waiting
and willing to receive this attention are the bar’s other patrons, whom
David describes as the young, effeminate folles (birds). Dressed much
like women, gossiping with each other in high-voices, they, too, play a
role, hoping to obtain the approval and attention of men like
Guillaume and Jacques.
Baldwin’s focus on pederasty—the sexual practice of an older male
courting the younger in a symbiotic relationship of sex and education—
in Giovanni’s Room, is historically and contemporarily representative of
Parisian homosexual activity.15 During the 1950s, the area of Saint
Germain-des-Prés emerged as the first area in Paris where homosexual
males began to visibly congregate at specifically identified homosexual
bars and restaurants, a change from previously “cruising” parks and the
Seine. Most of these males were the younger, more effeminate folles,
whose visible portrayal of their homosexuality mirrored the visibility of
the bars they frequented. David’s condescending narration of them,
however, reflects the opinion of Baldwin and an older generation of
French homosexuals, who viewed these young gays with disdain for
abandoning their masculine virility in favor of what they viewed as a
performance of the inferior feminine. Retrospectively though, French
scholar Georges Siderís credits these effeminate homosexuals, through
these outlandish performative acts of visibility, as the first French
homosexuals to successfully show marked resistance against the laws.16
Characteristic of his conservative American values, Baldwin never
has David explicitly say that sex is the goal of these “performances”
between the folles and the older men, even though the intention is clear
15
Dennis Altman, “Paris” in The Christopher Street Reader, ed. Michael Denney,
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16
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to the reader. Baldwin’s self-censorship suggests an unspoken sexual
aspect to the French homosexual display that his American perspective
does not fully condone. This hesitation is explicitly emphasized in a
conversation between David and Jacques, which isolates a fundamental
cultural difference between American and French opinions of sex’s role
in (homosexual) relationships. Steeped in his American, sexually
conservative perspective, David attacks Jacques’ sexual behavior, inquir
ing , “Is there really no other way for you [to love] but this? To kneel
down forever before an army of boys for just five dirty minutes in the
dark?” Jacques directly challenges David, however, justifying his sexual
activity as meaning ful, responding, “if you think of them as dirty, then
they will be dirty—they will be dirty because you will be giving nothing ,
you will be despising your flesh and his.”17 For Jacques, there is no
shame in sex. His perspective reflects a more general French cultural
view of the act itself, which unabashedly acknowledges the beauty of the
physical.
Regarding French homosexuality and the arts, admiration of the
physical is most clearly represented in Jean Genet’s iconic twenty-five
minute film Un Chant d’Amour (1950).18 Set in an unnamed prison,
the film is a visual ode to the beauty in the physical manifestation of
male homosexual love. The film focuses on the sexual seduction be
tween prisoners, a prison guard’s voyeurism, and repetitive images of
masturbation, coupled with the imagery of prison walls as both physical
and symbolic barriers between male-to-male connections. These
components represent the French homosexual reality from 1942-1981.
Genet’s artistic vision of the French homosexual contrasts Baldwin’s,
beginning with his focus on a sex that Baldwin could not even face.
Genet’s characters are empowered and uplifted through sex precisely
because it is the unique physical manifestation of their sexual identity.
Although the film is composed of separate, g raphic vignettes of males
pleasuring themselves or other males, its tone is anything but porno
graphic. Rather, the ultimate inability for these men to reach through
17
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the prison walls that separate them is a tragic rendering of futile
pursuits of fulfillment and thwarted homosexual love. This must be
seen as Genet’s artistic resistance of the anti-sodomy laws, which
wrongly punished and imprisoned men for merely desiring to embrace
and love another, and further stifled and debased the beauty of the
sexual act itself—contradicting French cultural values.
Just as with Un Chant d’Amour, Jean Genet’s life and writings have
done more to distinguish and uplift the French homosexual identity
than any other man’s in the last fifty years. The key homosexual author
of his time, Genet’s literature unequivocally pushed the French
homosexual towards unashamed self-identification and representation
between 1942-1981. Largely shaped by his own homosexual develop
ment under the laws, as well as his learned cultural embracing of sex,
Genet’s literary focus is always on the sexual. His fiction embraces the
sex act by presenting male characters that unabashedly describe their
sexual fantasies. Genet’s focus on the sexual encounter is also an act of
political resistance. Every time he writes a character that is unafraid to
pursue and feel pleasure, Genet uplifts the homosexual, validating and
honoring his desires. 19
Despite this freedom within his literature, Genet’s life as a
homosexual in Paris under the laws required secrecy, repression, and
watchfulness. As his biographer Edmund White notes, Genet himself
was an avid frequenter of certain metro and train stations that were
known for “cruising” and sexual encounters.20 Characteristically, “cruis
ing” is sex shrouded in anonymity, and transitory in its very nature. For
both participants the connection is often forbidden from the start, and
the circumstances for meeting explicitly suggest a mutual desire for
sexual gratification. American photographer Duane Michal’s famous
photograph series Chance Meeting visually captures the spontaneity of
19
Jean Genet, Our Lady of the Flowers, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York:
Grove Press, 1963), 89.
20
Edmund White, Genet: A Biography (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 387
389.
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such an encounter between two men. 21 Set in an alleyway in broad day
light, the piece is divided into two columns of six photographic frames.
It is a progressive series of two mid-aged men walking towards each
othe r. Neither man stops the other as their bodies pass in the fourth
frame, but the viewer can sense the shift in tone. Both men appear to be
interested in each othe r. Each subsequent frame shows the two men
alternating looks back at the other, never meeting eyes, with each ulti
mately hesitating in their mutual desire to go back and pursue the
connection. Regardless of whether one was French or American, these
photographs reflect a common reality for homosexual men between
1942-1981.
In France, this forced silencing of desire due solely to homo
sexuality gained some reprieve in 1981 when newly elected François
Mitterrand and the Socialist Party repealed the restrictive laws of 1942
and 1960. With this new freedom to visibly congregate and express
their homosexuality, French men in Paris began to carve out Le Marais,
Paris’s first neighborhood dedicated to the commercial development of
gay-friendly businesses.22 Despite mixed feelings within the French
homosexual community, who feared the explicit development of a “gay
ghetto,” Le Marais has nevertheless become Paris’s gay cente r. Within
this homosexual urban space, which is not raided and legally restricted
like Saint-Germain-des-Prés of the 1950s, Le Marais’ inhabitants still
act like the previous generation; pursuing the sexual encounter is still a
priority.
American homosexual Edmund White and his French lover,
Hubert Sorin, illuminate this lingering sexual reality present in Le
Marais in their co-memoir Our Paris: Sketches from Memory. White, a
well-known contemporary homosexual writer and cultural voice,
describes a typical nightlife scene in Le Marais to highlight the focus on
sexual gratification:

21
Duane Michals, Chance Meeting, photograph series, 1970, Pace/MacGill Gallery,
New York, NY. http ://www.pacemacg ill.com/duanemichals-29-4.html (accesse d May
22, 2009).
22
Michael D. Sibalis, “Ur ban Space and Homosexuality : The Example of the
Marais, Paris’ Gay Ghetto,” Urban Studies 41, no. 9 (2004): 1745.
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Wolf packs of guys in leather or jeans…stalk down the rue des
Lombards. They are on their way from the Quetzal Bar on the
rue des Mauvais Ga rçons (Bad Boys’ Street), which quietly
booms behind its new bossed and brushed chrome façade like
a party in a submerged submarine, to the Banana Caf é in Les
Halles with its go-go boys.23
The desire for casual encounters is accentuated in the subtle, sexual
dynamic of the men themselves. Although the “types” look different
than their 1950s counterparts, this scene still suggests the same sexual
performances Baldwin described. The men in leather and jeans, who
come from “Bad Boys’ Street,” stalk towards the Banana Caf é, in pur
suit of its “go-go boys,” the more effeminate, yet equally sexualized and
willing participants. Other French homosexual contemporaries of
White readily agree with his description of Le Marais here. For ex
ample, scholar Frédéric Martel acknowledges how heavily Le Marais
nightlife revolves around bars, saunas, and backroom scenes, insinuating
that sexual gratification is still a main pursuit for French homosexuals.24
Accompanying White’s text is a corresponding illustration by
White’s lover, Hubert Sorin. Like White’s observations, Sorin’s illustra
tion also suggests that Le Marais’ homosexuals are concerned with more
sullied pursuits.25 His critique is framed through a drawing of Les Mots
à la Bouche, “the local gay and lesbian bookshop” located at one end of
rue Sainte-Croix de la Bretonnerie, a central Marais thoroughfare. The
store has remained a frequented landmark of the homosexual commu
nity since its opening in 1980.26 Amidst a background of innumerous
shelves, labeled only by various sections such as body-art, musculation,
bisexualité, and oral, Sorin draws two younger, more casually dressed
23
Edmund White, Our Paris: Sketches from Memory, illus. Hubert Sorin (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 60.
24
Frédéric Martel, The Pink and the Black: Homosexuals in France since 1968, trans.
Jane Marie Todd (Stanford, CA : Stanford University Press, 1999), 204-205.
25
White, Our Paris, 58.
26
White, Our Paris, 58; Les Mots á la Bouche, “Notre Librairie : Historique [Our
Bookstore: History],” Les Mots á la Bouche, http://www.motsbouche.com/ (accesse d
May 1, 2009). Les Mots á la Bouche is a gay and lesbian spe cialty bookstore located in
Paris.
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male caricatures, presumably bookstore and Marais regulars. One male
is looking at a drawing of a penis while the other is reading a text that
says only “sex, sex, sex.” Sorin’s critique of Le Marais’ gay community is
explicit—their homosexuality is preoccupied with “pornography,” the
body, and other debased topics.
Although both White and Sorin seem to offer critical opinions of
Le Marais, the fact that they do so within a shared literary space might
symbolically represent a bridging of the American and French cultural
perspectives from previous decades. Moreover, their critique arises from
their personal experience as lovers, and homosexuals that have arguably
moved beyond the laws and claimed their right to a monogamous, visi
ble, and sustained relationship. Of course, just as with heterosexuals,
monogamy is not for every gay man. Still, their dual critique here stems
from the same place as both Baldwin and Genet’s previous writings.
Regardless of his nationality, culture, or generation, each man writes
with the ultimate desire to be uninhibited in his homosexual identity,
where the only requirement is that he is free—free to live and free to
love.
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AN AMERICA THAT COULD BE: EMMA GOLDMAN,
ANARCHISM, AND THE “AMERICAN DREAM”
By Christina Samons
The so-called “Gilded Age,” 1865-1901, was a period in American his
tory characterized by great progress, but also of great turmoil. The
evolving social, political, and economic climate challenged the way of
life that had existed in pre-Civil War America as European immigration
rose alongside the appearance of the United States’ first big businesses
and factories.1 One figure emerges from this era in American history as
a forerunner of progressive thought: Emma Goldman. Responding, in
part, to the transformations that occurred during the Gilded Age,
Goldman gained notoriety as an outspoken advocate of anarchism in
speeches throughout the United States and through published essays
and pamphlets in anarchist newspapers. Years later, she would synthe
size her ideas in collections of essays such as Anarchism and Other
Essays, first published in 1917.
The purpose of this paper is to contextualize Emma Goldman’s
anarchist theory by placing it firmly within the economic, social, and
1
Alan M. Kraut, The Huddled Masses: The Immig rant in American Society, 1880
1921 ( Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 2001), 14.
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political reality of turn-of-the-twentieth-century America while dem
onstrating that her theory is based in a critique of the concept of the
“American Dream.” To Goldman, American society had drifted away
from the ideal of the “American Dream” due to the institutionalization
of exploitation within all aspects of social and political life—namely,
economics, religion, and law. The first section of this paper will give a
brief account of Emma Goldman’s position within American history at
the turn of the twentieth century. It will then discuss how Goldman’s
use of the rhetoric of American independence and individualism helps
us to fully understand the problems she saw in her contemporary
society. Lastly, this paper will describe the ideal social system that would
exist under Goldman’s model of anarchism.
Since Goldman’s theory arises out of her criticism of late
nineteenth-century American institutions, it is important to under
stand the position she occupied within such society. The traditional
narrative of the “American Dream” tells of the unlimited potential in
America for any person, regardless of social status or origin, to become
economically successful through his or her own hard work and dedica
tion. Coupled with the fact that the period from roughly 1880-1921
saw an unparalleled increase in the number of immigrants into Amer
ica—largely from Eastern European countries—the “American dream”
described above became a powerful driving force for industrial growth.2
Unfortunately, for most of the immigrant population, this “dream” was
little more than a myth. Instead of prosperity, many immigrants found
that “by the end of the nineteenth century…unregulated working con
ditions and the free market in urban real estate caused the exploitation
of millions of workers and in turn provoked protest and violence from
below.”3 Historical accounts of workers’ protests increase rapidly from
the end of the nineteenth century into the twentieth century and the
growth of trade unions provide further evidence to corroborate these
statements.4
2

Ibid., 23.
Melvyn Dubofsky, Industrialism and the American Worker, 1865-1920 (Wheel
ing , IL: Harlan Davidson, 1996), 75.
4
Ibid., 79.
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One explanation for Goldman’s advocacy of anarchism is that she
desired to critique the difficult economic situation facing many immi
grants at the turn of the twentieth century from her own position as an
immigrant. Goldman herself had been born into a Jewish family in
Lithuania—then a province of the Russian Empire—and had spent her
youth in St. Petersburg before finding her way to in 1885 America at
the age of seventeen. Goldman’s movement from Prussia to the United
States provided her with knowledge of numerous languages, cultures,
and movements, which all contributed in varying degrees to her
thought.5 Although most of her early speeches were done in German,
she quickly realized the importance of connecting with her new Ameri
can compatriots by speaking English. The shift from German to English
marked her personal transition from an immigrant “outsider” to a no
torious public figure with whom one could get arrested for shaking
hands. Not only would using English help her to reach a broader
American audience, but it also shows her commitment to working
through the tradition and history of America from a “new” American’s
point a view. Although she came from an Eastern European back
ground, Goldman fully embraced American culture, and her theory of
anarchism is consequently firmly grounded in problems prevalent in the
United States during her lifetime. In her speeches and essays, she com
mented on events that had relevance and immediacy in America as she
saw them unfold within the context of contemporary society.
In fact, only after moving to the United States and hearing about
the May 1886 Haymarket Affair in Chicago did Goldman officially
become an anarchist. 6 On March 4, 1886, a large group of workers held
a labor rally in the Haymarket Square in Chicago. As the rally dispersed,
an unknown person threw a pipe bomb into the crowd, killing
numerous civilians and eight police officers. Following the incident,
eight men associated with the anarchist organizers of the originally rally
5
Emma Goldman: A Documentary History of the American Years, vol. 1, ed.
Candace Falk (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 489.
6
Candace Falk, “Forging Her Place: An Introduction,” in Emma Goldman: A
Documentary History of the American Years, vol. 1, 1-84 (se e note 5), 6.
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were put on trail for murder—all eight were convicted.7 At the time,
some had argued that the incident was a consequence of rampant
immigration and radical foreign idealism challenging American values.
As historian Melvyn Dubofsky notes, “For many, the [Haymarket]
incident justified fears of the ‘reckless foreign wretches,’ as one
newspaper termed the protesting workers.”8 On the other hand, the
Haymarket Affair became a rallying cry against police brutality,
corruption, and prejudice against persons whose political views did not
conform to mainstream society. Goldman sympathized with the latter
view and was appalled at the flagrant disregard for justice of Illinois
Judge Gary, quoting him fictitiously in her essay “The Psychology of
Political Violence” as saying, “Not because you have caused the
Haymarket bomb, but because you are Anarchists, are you on trial.”9
However, while Goldman was certainly aware of the problems
facing industrial workers, who were largely immigrants, and
sympathized with their plight, her formulation of anarchism extends
beyond a purely socio-economic critique to a historical critique. In her
theory, she argues for a return to past American ideals—that is, a
glorification of the principles first set forth during the American
Revolution. Thus, the “American Dream” that Goldman believed to
have been perverted throughout post-Civil War America, was not the
traditional “rags to riches” fable, but the “dream” of a new nation that
privileged individualism and natural freedom above all else. According
to Goldman, these were the values advocated by America’s “founding
fathers,” who declared independence from Great Britain in 1776 and
subsequently wrote the United States Constitution. Goldman chose to
present anarchism as a necessary response to problems rooted in the
unique circumstances of American history in the decades following the
American Civil War.
One way in which Goldman commented on the loss of American
values in “Gilded Age” society was by appropriating traditional
7
Paul Avrich, The Haymarket Tragedy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1986), 208.
8
Kraut, 89.
9
Emma Goldman, “The Psycholog y of Political Violence” in Anarchism and Other
Essays, 79-108 (New York: Dover Publications, 1969), 87.
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American rhetoric to her own advantage, using it as a foil with which
she contrasted the current state of affairs in America. As traditional
schoolchildren during the time period were instructed in such areas as
the wording of the Declaration of Independence, Goldman’s use of
common phrases such as “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” was
able to draw on the national ideology instilled in many Americans since
childhood. In “A New Declaration of Independence,” for instance,
Goldman used language and composition based on the Declaration of
Independence, proclaiming, “We hold these truths to be self-evident:
that all human beings, irrespective of race, color, or sex, are born with
the equal right to share at the table of life; that to secure this right, there
must be established among men economic, social, and political
freedom.”10 The combination of the familiar American phrase “We
hold these truths to be self-evident” from the actual Declaration of
Independence with the subsequent reformulation of anarchist goals cre
ates a sense of irony that served to ridicule the current state, which had,
according to Goldman, distanced itself and society from the “truths”
established at the origin of the United States.
It important to note here the distinction Goldman drew between a
commitment to adhering to what she viewed as original American
ideals as opposed to the “perverted conception of patriotism” she linked
to militarism, “conceit, arrogance and egotism.”11 To Goldman,
patriotism represented the view that one nation believes itself to be
greater than some other nation and, by virtue of that fact, may
dominate others. This view is contrary to the equalizing nature of
anarchism, which provides each person or group with the freedom to
achieve their individual goals without relying on exploitative measures.
Patriotism is also contrary to providing the freedom of all individuals
10
Emma Goldman, “A New Declaration of Independence,” Mother Earth 4, no. 5
( July 1909). Available online at http ://ucblibrary3.berkeley.e du/Goldman/ Wr iting s/
Essays/independence.html, (accessed November 30, 2009).
11
Emma Goldman, “The Trage dy at Buffalo” (article, Free Society, October 6,
1901), Jewish Women’s Archive. (Brookline, MA : Jewish Wo men’s Archive, 1998),
http ://jwa.org/exhibits/jsp/article.jsp?&imgfile=exhibits//imag es/exhban15.gif&media_
id=aegtragedy1 (accesse d November 30, 2009).
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that Goldman always hoped to achieve, because it asserts a false
hierarchy of power relationships.12
Goldman also utilized irony and repetitive rhetoric to assert the
specifically American identity of her vision of anarchism in order to
oppose critics who condemned her theory as foreign and “unAmerican.” After the assassination of William McKinley in September
1901, newspaper reports emerged that linked Goldman to assassin Leon
Czolgosz by casting Czolgosz as an impressionable Polish foreigner who
was inspired to the act by Goldman’s radical anarchist speeches.13 In
defense of both herself and Czolgosz, Goldman wrote “The Tragedy at
Buffalo,” in which she challenged the popular misconception that he
was a foreigner and that his act was a manifestation of the European
assault on American values.
To achieve this effect, Goldman contextualized his situation
within a corrupted society in which “a small band of parasites have
robbed the American people and trampled upon the fundamental prin
ciples laid down by the forefathers of this country.”14 Goldman emph
asized that the American tradition of individualism was falsely
employed to promote the growth of capitalism and the formation of
both state and non-state institutions. “In vain they are making the
world believe that he is the product of European conditions, and
influenced by European ideas,” she argued, “This time the ‘assassin’
happens to be the child of Columbia [Ohio], who lulled him to sleep
with ‘My country, ‘tis of thee, Sweet land of liberty,’ and who held out
the hope to him that he, too, could become President of the country.”15
Through the use of tropes and traditions that would be familiar to her
American audience—in this case with the lyrics of “My Country ‘tis of
Thee”—she played on the idea of a basic American identity by drawing
attention to the shared heritage of the audience and Czolgosz, who
would both recognize the lyrics and thus be reminded of their
upbringing within American society.
12
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Conjuring up the imagery related to adolescence is important for
Goldman’s theory because her theory also asserts that adolescence is the
stage of development in which the concept of an American identity is
formed in citizens’ minds. To Goldman, adolescence is also char
acterized by innocence, and her rhetoric creates an identity for
Czolgosz that associated his irresponsibility for his deed with the
innocence of young children being taught about American history and
ideals. Goldman does not argue for a return to an individual’s literal
adolescence, but to the fundamental principles of the revolutionary
period of United States history that America was premised upon, which
were characterized by a strong commitment to freedom.
Furthermore, she believed that the United States’ commitment to
freedom followed directly from a very clear individualist tradition that
began before the Revolutionary War and continued through the early
nineteenth century. In many of the newspaper and magazine articles
Goldman wrote after arriving in America, she hearkened back to an era
in American history in which individuals stood up for their own desires
in the face of government persecution. She often referenced the
writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David
Thoreau, and John Brown, who each argued for various forms of
individualism in their philosophies. Goldman read these writers
extensively after she arrived in America and their thoughts informed
her views on the individual’s relationship to the political and
institutional.16 From Emerson, for example, anarchists in the late
nineteenth century utilized the idea that individuals should trust their
own judgment and investigate for themselves the popular standards of
thoughts and cultures.17 This idea paralleled Goldman’s belief that
anarchism would break with the exploitative tradition of American
republican democracy and challenge the population as a whole to
rethink and analyze their current situation.18 Goldman’s thought is also
16
“ Talk with Emma Goldman.” New York Sun, January 6, 1901, in Emma
Goldman: A Documentary History of the American Years, vol. 1, 423-431 (see note 5), 426.
17
Lillian Browne, “Emerson the Anarchist,” Mother Earth Bulletin 4, no. 10,
(December 1909): 330.
18
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strongly influenced by Emerson’s recognition of the close relationship
between humans and the natural earth, and the human body’s
subordination to the whims of its natural desires, which will be
discussed later.19
At the heart of Goldman’s theory of anarchism, then, is a strong
disavowal of the state and institutions that serve to naturalize mech
anisms for exploitation and suppress individual freedom. Hence,
Goldman explicitly defined anarchism as “the liberation of the human
mind from the dominion of religion; the liberation of the human body
from the dominion of property; liberation from the shackles and
restraint of government.”20 Goldman’s theory of anarchism was also a
subtle criticism of the democratic republic, in which the interests of the
maximum number of citizens are mediated through a specific individual
elected to represent those citizens. The problem Goldman located was
that republics allow another person to make decisions on an
individual’s behalf. Although, in theory, representatives are elected by
the people they represent, Goldman argued that the republican form of
government provided an opening for exploitation to occur in the gap
between the desires of an individual and the desires of a representative.
As the American system of government developed and the discrepancy
between individuals and their representatives grew wide, exploitation
effectively became institutionalized through official channels, which
then reinforced and extended it into other sectors of society. Observing
how the state government dominated the economic, social, and legal
policies of the era, Goldman not only wished to dispense with gov
ernment institutions, but also with institutions that she viewed as
exploitative in their current states, such as religion or education. In
order to analyze how Goldman saw the state as institutionalizing
exploitation, it will be helpful to divide her arguments with regards to
three separate categories: economics, law, and religion. In all three
categories, Goldman contrasts institutions and the natural state of
humans as individuals, and therefore casts institutions as oppressive and
preventing individual growth.
19
20
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As previously mentioned, economic issues were extremely relevant
in Goldman’s time due to rapid industrialization and the influx of
immigrants who were usually employed as unskilled workers that sup
ported industrialism.21 She traces the exploitative nature of the
institutionalized capitalist economic system to the protection of private
property, reconstituting the words of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, widely
considered the first anarchist thinker, who famously wrote, “Property is
theft!”22 Goldman criticized the evolution of property in American
society by defining it as, “the dominion of man’s needs, the denial of the
right to satisfy his needs.”23 Of course, all individuals rely on certain
items of property for survival and livelihood, but Goldman argued that
in the exploitative capitalist system of the United States, humans are
not even able to maintain their basic property needs since they are
forced to provide goods for an arbitrary superior in exchange for menial
wages. The monotony of the mechanized capitalist system stripped
human beings of their ability to “enjoy the full fruit of [their] labor,”24
because they cannot work in a job that is important, let alone desirable,
to them. The dire economic situation of the era prevented certain
people from enjoying their right to all three essential aspects of “life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” outlined in the Declaration of
Independence. Goldman argued that true individualism was being
wrongly mobilized within society under the guise of capitalism, which
assumed that entrepreneurship of business was an expression of the
individual’s motivation and dedication to work, when entrepreneurship
actually prevented individualist expression through exploitation.
Goldman continued to criticize the separation of products from
their producers in “Anarchism: What it Really Stands For,” writing,
“Man is being robbed not merely of the products of his labor, but of the
power of free initiative, of originality, and the interest in, or desire for,
the things he is making.”25 Her argument mirrors the Marxist critique
21
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of capitalism, which marks the divide between an object’s use-value to
its producer and the exchange-value it can only receive when considered
in relation to some other product. According to Marx, “There it is a
definite social relation between men that assumes, in their eyes, the
fantastic form of a relation between things.”26 The subversion of usevalues to exchange values to Marx abstracts the product away from its
producer and leads to the confusion of social relationships between
people and the relationships between products. Allowing social rela
tionships to be replaced by products removes the human element from
production and opens up the possibility for subjugation and exploit
ation of the workers who actually produce products. Current
institutions reduce humans to machines that are inherently unnatural
and therefore contrary to the most beneficial way of life for an
individual. To counteract the exploitation of workers, Goldman wrote,
“Anarchism aims to strip labor of its deadening, dulling aspect, of its
gloom and compulsion. It aims to make work an instrument of joy, of
strength, of color, of real harmony, so that the poorest sort of a man
should find in work both recreation and hope.”27 Goldman believed
that people in an anarchist society would choose to work in an
occupation that is pleasurable to them and allows for the free expression
of their individual desires, free of any institutional constraints.
Secondly, Goldman held little faith in the institution of the law as
it existed in America at the turn of the century. As the Haymarket trials
showed, the laws that were supposed to protect society from crime and
danger did not actually function that way, and, oftentimes, legal
protections were not given to many workers or underprivileged
members of society. One major anxiety about the formation of an anar
chist society was the concern that society would dissolve into chaos
without a government or official legal institution to regulate it. It is
accurate to say that Goldman’s theory of anarchism is strongly opposed
26
Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1, trans. Ernest Unter
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to the official legal institutions, but in its place she posited a conception
of “natural law” as a regulative mechanism. Her definition of natural
law can be seen as stemming from the transcendentalist view of the
relationship between humans and nature of Ralph Waldo Emerson and
Henry David Thoreau. Natural law is defined by Goldman as “that
factor in man which asserts itself freely and spontaneously without any
external force, in harmony with the requirements of nature. For in
stance, the demand for nutrition, for sex gratification, for light, air, and
exercise.”28 These demands cannot find expression through institutions
because the form of institutions is inherently opposed to a state of
nature characterized by individual freedom. She inverts the common
idea that laws are needed to maintain order in society and instead
considers them as part of the larger social problem that causes crime.
Anarchism does not equate to violence because politics is violence, and
anarchism and the political are opposed to one another. According to
Goldman’s view of anarchism, violence would not be an issue in a truly
anarchist society because there would be no repressive and violent state
for individuals to react against.
By extending Goldman’s arguments further, it is clear that she
would be opposed to the idea that “natural law” is formed and given to
mankind by God or a higher being. Religion expects its members to
adhere to strict moral codes that affect all aspects of life. According to
Goldman, however, the moral codes of religion do promote the basics
of life, but, instead, impose unnecessary restrictions on personal free
dom. As she states, “[Religion] repudiates, as something vile and sinful,
our deepest feelings; but being absolutely ignorant as to the real
functions of human emotions, Puritanism is itself the creator of the
most unspeakable vices.”29 Religion is hypocritical, therefore, because it
suppresses individual desires and asserts a moral hierarchy that does not
actually exist, which ironically creates the specific problems that it
hopes to address. Since religion excludes certain individuals from being
considered moral, Goldman subjects it to the same criticism of
28

Ibid., 58.
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patriotism explored previously in this paper. Goldman’s theory views
both the laws created by government and the moral rules created by
religion as restricting individual liberties, even though those laws have
erroneously been thought of as reflecting “natural law.” Goldman’s
conception of “natural law” is not exploitative, as is human law, because
it evolves from the expression of individual desires and requires only
“spontaneity and free opportunity” for the laws to be followed.30 In this
view, law does not function to resolve disputes or to judge, because
there would presumably be no disputes within a system of anarchist
organization. Anarchism rejects the notion of an objective arbitrator of
justice because it requires obedience to a concept outside of oneself.
Therefore, the institution of religion is a flagrant oppressor of
individuals and should be repudiated along with all other institutions.
The brief account of Goldman’s critique of turn-of-the-century
society outlined above provides the necessary background to
understand her vision of an anarchist society. In Goldman’s anarchist
theory, individualist social organization would provide for human con
tentment through freedom of work and social relationships “based on
the free grouping of individuals for the purpose of producing real social
wealth, free access to the earth and full enjoyment of the necessities of
life, according to individual desires, tastes, and inclinations.”31
Although she emphasizes the inevitability of free associations of people,
Goldman refrains from establishing a set vision of what an anarchist
society would look like. She instead recognizes that the form of
anarchist society will result from the particular needs of the era in
which the society is formed.32
However, Goldman’s vision of a successful anarchist organization
of society is not without theoretical problems. For example, she does
not directly answer the critique that individual desires and interests
may clash as a result of the varied backgrounds and histories from which
each individual comes. Goldman locates the origin of most social ills
within “the state,” but even if individuals were able to abolish the state
30
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and institutions in the present, they may still be subject to action and
opinions carried over from a pre-anarchist society. For this reason,
Goldman foregrounds the inventive quality of anarchism in her theory,
arguing that anarchism is able to break free from tradition and outdated
ways of thinking which may otherwise hinder its application. In fact,
she describes the practical characteristic of anarchism as “[having]
vitality enough to leave the stagnant waters of the old, and built, as well
as sustain, new life.”33 Goldman again employs imagery revolving
around nature and life to highlight the most basic and essential ability
of creation and newness. Furthermore, the “new life” that is possible
within an anarchist society can only be brought about through a
revolution and a radical restructuring of the current status quo.
In conclusion, it is unfortunate that anarchism, as both a political
and social theory, maintains a negative connotation in today’s society
and has become synonymous with uncontrollable chaos and disorder.
Because of this stigma, anarchist theories like Goldman’s have, more or
less, been pushed to the fringe of popular political theory even though
her ideas can still inform our present situation nearly a century later.
Contemporary complaints about the recent economic crisis and the
problems arising from unchecked capitalism echo many of the crit
icisms of institutional exploitation that Emma Goldman raised at the
turn of the twentieth century. Global violence has not been eradicated
by any means, despite the formation of numerous laws and
international agreements, and many workers struggle to sustain them
selves economically through jobs they do not enjoy. While many aspects
of Goldman’s theory may not be relevant today, the transformative
characteristic of anarchism—which requires a break from tradition and
the creation of something new while still retaining a sense of history—
could be an advantageous approach to future policy-making at the
institutional level.
33
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Emma Goldman’s vision of anarchism, therefore, was one of
individualism and natural freedom, not of chaos and disorder. Looking
back on her speeches and writings, it is clear that Goldman simply
wanted American society to achieve freedom from all constraints and
exploitation and to gain confidence in the natural state of individuals
that maintains that freedom.
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IN DEFENSE OF SOUTHERN HONOR: PRESTON BROOKS
AND THE ATTACK ON CHARLES SUMNER
By Daniel Lawrence Slusser
On May 22, 1856, South Carolina Congressman Preston Brooks
approached the desk of Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner follow
ing a meeting on the floor of the Senate chamber. As Sumner was busily
writing, Brooks calmly announced in a low voice, “Mr. Sumner, I have
read your speech twice over carefully. It is a libel on South Carolina,
and Mr. Butler, who is a relative of mine.”1 These were the last words
Sumner heard before he was repeatedly struck by Brooks’s cane.2 As the
blows rained down on Sumner’s head, he attempted to rise from his
chair and defend himself. However, his thighs were pinned down be
tween his chair and his desk, which was anchored to the floor of the
Senate chamber—Sumner was in no position to escape. As Sumner
1
David Donald, Charles Sumner and the Coming of the Civil War (New York: Al
fred A. Knopf, 1960), 294. Brooks had intende d to say more but cut his speech short
when it looked like Sumner would tr y to stand.
2
Ibid., 294. This is Sumner’s version of Brooks’s speech. Brooks’s version is longer
and more detailed but Donald finds Sumner’s version more reliable. For Brooks’s version
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struggled, Preston Brooks continued using his cane to lay brutal stripes
across his victim’s head until Sumner, in a final act of desperation to
save his own life, applied his adrenaline-fueled strength to tear his desk
from its moorings.
Sumner received close to ten stripes to the head at this point. The
blows tore open his scalp and blood poured into his eyes, rendering him
temporarily blind. Coupled with the confusion resulting from concus
sions to the grey matter within his skull, this blindness left him just as
defenseless as he was while trapped beneath his desk. Yet, Brooks was
unyielding, and continued to strike at Sumner even after his cane had
snapped in two. Sumner began to flail his arms about randomly, con
vulsing uncontrollably as moaning guttural noises emanated from his
mouth, likely symptomatic of a seizure caused by the beating. Brooks
continued to strike. Lapsing into total unconsciousness, Sumner began
to fall, and knocked over another anchored desk. Before he could hit
the ground, however, Brooks caught him by the lapel of his jacket and
held him up as he continued with his beating.
After a total of thirty blows had been applied to Sumner’s skull,
what was left of Brooks’s cane had disintegrated into splinters, leaving
only the gold handle intact in his fist. The beating only came to an end
when fellow Senators and Congressman, reacting to the ruckus, came to
Sumner’s aid and restrained Brooks. They described the shoulders of
Sumner’s jacket as being saturated with blood through to his waistcoat
and shirt underneath, both of which were also covered in blood.3 Sum
ner subsequently laid in critical condition for months after the attack
and did not return to his seat in the Senate for another three years.
What motivated Preston Brooks’s vicious attack on Charles
Sumner? The short answer can be found in Brooks’s preface to the at
tack: Brooks believed himself to be defending the honor of his family
and fellow citizens of South Carolina. But even this, possibly oversim
plified, answer raises a number of questions. Why did Brooks believe
this attack, which today seems grossly disproportionate to the offense,
to be justified? Was Brooks’s response to Sumner’s speech appropriate
in antebellum Southern culture? Does this attack point to any cultural
3
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themes that were promoted and maintained in the antebellum South?
After reviewing the circumstances leading up to the attack and
examining the cultural pressures to defend honor within antebellum
Southern society, I believe that the answers to these questions will show
that the “Bleeding Sumner” incident represented a microcosmic
example of the cultural motivations for the Civil War.
The speech that had offended Brooks had been delivered by
Sumner two days prior to the attack. In the speech, Sumner condemned
the ongoing violence in “Bleeding Kansas” and accused South Carolina
Senator Andrew Butler of promoting such violence by virtue of his
expressed desire that Kansas would emerge from the conflict as a slave
state. Sumner also referred to Butler as an American equivalent of Don
Quixote, claiming that he had taken a “harlot” mistress that, in Butler’s
deluded mind, was a woman of virtue—the mistress Sumner referred to
was slavery.4 Sumner also ridiculed Butler’s physical impairments that
caused him to slur his speech and emit spittle as he spoke.
Butler’s cousin, Preston Brooks, was deeply offended when he
heard of Sumner’s insulting remarks. Yet, Brooks did not act impul
sively. He waited until the speech had been transcribed and after
“carefully reading” the speech twice and conferring with friends, he
made the decision to attack Sumner. In his deliberations he never con
sidered whether or not he should take offense to Sumner’s rhetoric. He
only concerned himself with how Sumner should be punished. After
considering a number of traditional options, including dueling, lashing
with a horsewhip, or beating with a cowhide, Brooks decided on the use
of a gutta-percha cane as an appropriate, and supposedly durable,
weapon. Brooks decided against the traditional use of a horsewhip or a
cow’s hide because Sumner was three inches taller than Brooks and at
least thirty pounds heavier. Sumner could have easily overpowered
Brooks if given an opportunity to wrest the weapon from his grasp.
Given this issue, Brooks decided on a gutta-percha cane with a gold
handle that weighed eleven and one-half ounces and tapered from one
4
Charles Sumner, “On the Crime Against Kansas (1856),” in The World’s Famous
Orations, vol. 9, e d. William Jennings Bryan and Francis Whiting Halsey, 160-173 (New
York: Funk and Wagnalls Company, 1906), 168.
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inch at the handle to three-quarters of an inch at the end. The light
weight of the cane would allow Brooks to make repeated quick strikes
to disable Sumner at the beginning of the fight and thereby prevent a
defensive counter-attack. 5
Just in case Brooks was harboring any thoughts of not redressing
Sumner’s insults, his friends had continually asked him following
Sumner’s speech: “Has the chivalry of South Carolina escaped, and is
this to be tame submission?” Not responding to such criticism would
certainly have left Brooks powerless in his home state, as he would have
been seen as devoid of honor and courage.6 Although Brooks had stated
in a truce with a Northern congressman two years earlier that he had
abandoned sectionalism and instead supported what he termed “Con
stitutionalism,” the offense to his state and family honor was too great
to be ignored. He felt this had to be answered swiftly and severely,
regardless of any intimations in the past that would have tolerated a
rude difference of opinion from a Northerner, especially a Northerner
as outspoken as Charles Sumner.
It is possible that Brooks’s need to be seen by his peers as a man of
honor was his highest priority. Without his reputation as a “man of
honor,” he was unlikely to gain campaign supporters or Southern en
dorsement of his motions in the House of Representatives.7 The con
cept of honor was the cultural cornerstone of the gentlemen’s society in
the antebellum South. While this concept was certainly not foreign to
those in the North, it took on a different significance there. Honor in
the North referred to one’s personal morality, honesty, integrity, and
reliability. To have honor in the South, however, a gentleman needed
all of these qualities and to be vigorously supportive of the Southern
way of life.
This need to support the Southern way of life was founded on the
premise that Southern culture was perfect. The insistence on perfection
was applied to every aspect of Southern life, ranging from the South’s
slave-supported agricultural economy to Southern customs, Southern
5
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preferences in literature, and even leisure activities. Each of these insti
tutions and customs had to be defended aggressively lest they be
esteemed to lose their perfect luster.
A key reason that sectionalism developed in antebellum America
was because Southerners resented that Northerners had altered tradi
tional American culture by adopting industrialism and abolitionist
beliefs. Southerners perceived these changes as a slight on conservative
Southern culture. For Northerners to suggest that any variance to this
tradition represented a more “enlightened” approach to life, struck at
the heart of Southern identity and Southern pride in its traditions.8
Southern gentlemen, however, had a means of dealing with others’
claims of superiority—the “Southern Code”.
The Southern Code was not a written law, but an unspoken tradi
tion that prescribed proper behavior and specific punishment for those
who deviated from the “proper” course. It covered nearly every aspect of
a Southern gentleman’s life, including: how a gentleman should speak
to a woman, the proper relationship between a white man and his slave,
the proper mode of dueling with other gentlemen, and the appropriate
means of punishment for slander.9 Yet, the Code’s prescribed punish
ments were not meant to apply solely to the uncouth brigands in the
North. In the Southern gentleman’s mind they were applicable to any
dispute between men in the North or the South. In an argument in
1848 between Georgia State Judge Francis Cone and future Confeder
ate Vice President Alexander Stephens, for example, the latter ended
up being stabbed eighteen times by the former over a misunderstanding
regarding a rumor that Cone had challenged Stephens’s honor.10 This
violent defense of honor was part of a long tradition of Southern justice
8
Charles S. Sydnor, “The Southerner and the Laws,” The Journal of Southern His
tory 6, no. 1 (Feb. 1940): 16; Edward Pessen, “The Similarities between the Antebellum
North and South,” in Major Problems in the Civil War and Reconstruction, ed. Michael
Perman, 2nd ed., 11-30 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 29.
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that had been handed down for generations. Andrew Jackson’s mother
famously taught him in Tennessee to “[never] sue anybody for slander
or assault and battery. Always settle them cases yourself!”11 Jackson was
obedient to his mother’s counsel and lived to fight in many duels in the
defense of his personal and family honor.12
In the decades leading up to the Civil War, the values that the
Southern Code defended were intensified. Disagreements over North
ern non-enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 and the
ongoing battle taking place in “Bleeding Kansas” served to fuel hatred
for Northern abolitionism in the hearts of Southern men, especially
slave owning aristocrats. Because the North did not have a “Gentle
men’s Code” like the Southern Code, Southerners were flabbergasted
that Northerners allowed speech that specifically ridiculed traditional
American beliefs such as the need for—and righteousness of—slavery.
In the face of this apparent lack of respect for tradition exhibited by
Northerners, Southerners retreated to the familiar emotional and intel
lectual territory carved out by Southern traditional culture and the
Southern Code. This was evident in the South’s strong embrace of
literature that romanticized the concept of the chivalrous gentleman
knight fighting to protect the honor of fair maidens and family. The
favored author of such books was Sir Walter Scott, made famous for his
classic adventure tales such as Ivanhoe (1820), Rob Roy (1817), and
Waverly (1814), among many others. Mark Twain quipped that prior
to the Civil War, the South had “Sir Walter disease.”13 Modern histo
rian Rollin Osterweis wrote, “Instead of looking awkwardly for the days
of knighthood, the South was convinced that it [was] living in them.”14
The decades preceding the Civil War saw the emergence of a new
type of gentleman known as the Southern cavalier. These cavaliers were
a kind of puffed up Southern gentleman playboy that viewed himself as
11
Sydnor, 12; Augustus C. Buell, History of Andrew Jackson: Pioneer, Patriot, Sol
dier, Politician, President, vol. 2 (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1904), 411.
12
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37.
13
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14
Ibid.

103

THE FORUM

a valiant knight of royal white descent who claimed the right to demand
reverence. Sumner ridiculed this Southern identity in his “Bleeding
Kansas” speech, accusing Andrew Butler of living in an imagined world
of chivalrous knighthood fueled by repeated readings of fantasy adven
ture books.15 Given Osterweis’s observation that Southern cavaliers
truly saw themselves as knights, Sumner’s insinuation that the Southern
cavalier was essentially an “emperor with no clothes” could not be toler
ated. It struck directly at the heart of Southern identity and the concept
of honor held by the cavaliers and stripped them of it in dramatic fash
ion. Brooks and his peers could not allow such an insult to go
unanswered without losing credibility and tacitly admitting that his
kinsmen had been living a farce of an existence.16
Southerners on the whole agreed with Brooks’s actions in defense
of his honor, whether it was imagined or not.17 This is evidenced by the
resounding support Brooks received from Southerners following the
beating. Numerous canes were sent to him with notes encouraging a
repeat of the attack on Sumner and other Northern abolitionists. One
such example was sent by an elderly female constituent of Brooks’s that
read, “the ladies of the South would be pleased to send [Brooks] hickory
sticks with which to chastise abolitionists and Republicans.”18 Many
newspapers heralded the attack as a righteous example of the kinds of
actions that were then required to combat the increasing Northern
disrespect for Southern values.19 Brooks even bragged, “The fragments
of the stick are begged for as sacred relicts.” The Richmond Enquirer
announced, “[The abolitionist Republicans] have grown saucy, and dare
to be impudent to gentlemen...The truth is, they have been suffered to
15
Charles Sumne r, “On the Crime Against Kansas (1856),” in The World’s Famous
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16
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run too long without collars. They must be lashed into submission.”20
Another Southern paper celebrated the, “classical caning which this
outrageous Abolitionist received… at the hands of chivalrous Brooks.”21
When a vote was taken in the House of Representatives to decide if
Brooks should be expelled from the organization on account of his as
sault on Sumner, all but one of the Southern congressmen voted against
expulsion.22 This broad support of Brooks was clearly a sign that the
vast majority of Southerners believed strongly in the authority of the
Southern Code. Not the least of which was Andrew Butler, who de
fended Brooks’s actions by saying that his cousin “[acted] under the
dictates of high honor.”23 Brooks defended himself by describing the
attack as a quest for protection of honor in his speech on July 14, 1856
to the House of Representatives. He proclaimed, “Whatever insults my
State insults me…I should have forfeited my own self-respect, and per
haps the good opinion of my countrymen, if I had failed to resent such
an injury by calling the offender in question to a personal account.”24 As
if to signify that the House was not worthy of a man of Brooks’s caliber
and honor, Brooks resigned his seat in the House at the end of his
speech, but was promptly reelected by his constituents to another term
in November.
Despite what Brooks, his constituents, and the papers were saying,
support for Brooks’s actions was not unanimous in the South. While it
is true that only one Southern congressman voted for expelling Brooks,
Charles Sumner’s memoirs list three Southern congressmen that
apologized for Brooks’s behavior.25 Given the political pressure from
other Southern leaders to protect Brooks, two of the three congressmen
later voted against Brooks’s expulsion in spite of their personal feelings
on the matter. This scenario demonstrates the difficulty of determining
20
William E. Gienapp, “The Caning of Charles Sumner and the Rise of the
Republican Party,” in Major Problems in the Civil War and Reconstruction, 41-52 (New
York: Houg hton Mifflin, 1998), 43.
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22
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25
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how widespread the Southern negative opinion of Brooks was during
this time. Not only was there massive peer pressure to support Brooks,
but there were also gag rules and censorship in place in the South at that
time. Mail was opened and any support of abolition or abolitionist
rhetoricians was not allowed to be delivered. Citizens who voiced sup
port for policies that would limit slavery in any way were at best
shunned and more often than not run out of town or worse. In one
extreme case, a newspaper distributor was hung in Arkansas for simply
carrying a copy of the New York Tribune, which was published by the
outspoken abolitionist Horace Greeley. Those who opposed secession
faced similar fates. Some were killed or intimidated by threats of vio
lence, some were simply paid off, while many others were aggressively
pressured into signing petitions in support of secession.26
However, as Bertram Wyatt-Brown concludes in his article,
“Honor and Secession,” these tactics of intimidation and censorship
were a means of preserving the honor of the South. Although there
were many Southerners who disapproved of Brooks’s actions, we can be
reasonably sure that the number of Brooks’s supporters far exceeded the
number of his detractors. Even with the limitations on free speech put
in place by Southern firebrands, we know that sectionalist rhetoric con
tinued to ramp up in the next five years preceding the Civil War.
Furthermore, secession and the war itself clearly prove general Southern
agreement with Brooks.
By the mid 1850s, many Northerners also came to expect this type
of violent response to aggressive abolitionist rhetoric from their South
ern counterparts. Directly following Sumner’s speech on “Bleeding
Kansas” his Northern friends in the Senate told him, “several of us are
going home with you” to offer some defense against a likely Southern
attack.27 This concern was not unwarranted. In the day following the
speech, a congressman from Tennessee was overheard saying, “Mr.
Sumner ought to be knocked down, and his face jumped into.”28 This
26
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27
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expectation of violence by Northern senators and the threats of vio
lence by Southern congressmen serve to further illustrate that the
Southern Code’s requirement of violent action in response to disgrace
was understood and complied with by Southerners, and was at least
roughly understood by many Northerners. Unfortunately for Sumner,
despite the warnings from his friends and the rumor mill around the
capital, he never saw it coming. He was so fully converted to the liberal
Northern mindset and so disgusted with slavery that he had somehow
forgotten that his words might be met with severe personal punish
ment. He remarked shortly after regaining consciousness while in the
capital following the flogging that he “could not believe that a thing like
this was possible.”29
Unionist Southern leaders knew that some violent response to
challenges of Southern honor were not only possible, but likely. These
few voices in the wilderness included a group of unionists in Missis
sippi. They believed that such behavior only represented a “fictitious
chivalry” that defended an artificial sense of honor embraced by cava
liers that feared Northern abolitionism. John Potter of Alabama
believed that the Southern instinct to claim honor for itself was a good
one but in this case it was misplaced and misguided. Potter described
this artificial form of Southern honor as “a morbid sense of honor”
expressed by “[men] in disgrace” who “vainly seek to maintain their
false view of true honor.”30 Potter also asserted that true honor does not
require constant defensive reactions to challenges. This is because true
honor is self-assuring and therefore transcends the need for approval
from inferiors. The “morbid false honor” he believed the South em
braced, was an honor derived from fear that was reinforced by making
juvenile threats to others. Those found possessed by this type of honor
were caught in a hypnotic trance that locked eyes with a chivalrous
angel of death.
The Sumner beating and its aftermath clearly illustrate this form of
Southern honor and how it was applied and maintained in antebellum
life. The assault on Sumner was certainly motivated by a desire to pro
29
30
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tect this honor. It was administered in a manner that was endorsed by
the “Southern Code”; a code that existed for the purpose of defining
and protecting honor. The fixation of the Southern gentry on this per
ceived need for honor motivated a violent response to the negative
judgments cast by Northerners. Ultimately, this tendency to violent
defense of honor helped to precipitate the Civil War and made the idea
of entering into such a war more palatable to Southerners. It may have
made some of them even relish it.31 Later, during the course of the Civil
War, Southern General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson expressed this
Southern morbid honor sentiment at Harpers Ferry: “What is life
without honor? Degradation is worse than death.”32
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BOOK REVIEWS

JOHN R. BOCKSTOCE.

Furs and Frontiers in the Far North: The
Contest Among Native and Foreign Nations for the Bering Strait Fur
Trade. NEW HAVEN, CT: YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2009. 496 PAGES.
Reviewed by John Paul Beck
Until recently, colonial historiography has primarily examined imperi
alism from the perspective of Europeans and downplayed the agency
and role of indigenous peoples. In Furs and Frontiers in the Far North:
The Contest Among Native and Foreign Nations for the Bering Strait Fur
Trade, John R. Bockstoce examines the interactions that occurred be
tween natives of the Bering Strait region and foreigners as they
competed for control over the fur, walrus tusk, and whaling industries.
Through Russian, British, and American expansion into the Bering
Strait region, the history became, as one foreign trader predicted,
“White men, whiskey, guns, powder and ball, small pox, debauchery,
[and] extermination” (p. 297). However, Bockstoce successfully dem
onstrates that natives actively sought, participated in, and altered trade
in the region. Additionally, Furs and Frontiers details foreign
explorations, expanding and shifting modes of commerce, and the life
style changes that occurred in native communities throughout the
Bering Strait region. In clearly laying out the history of the region, Furs
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and Frontiers is an excellent resource not only for studies of the Bering
Strait region, but also for understanding the history of imperialism,
globalization, and maritime commerce and exploration.
Bockstoce’s methodological approach examines the Bering Strait
region as a single unit of analysis in which national borders hardly help
to understand the control of commerce in the region. Bockstoce also
relies heavily on ethnography to derive information about indigenous
people. By analyzing tobacco and alcohol “frontiers” and the origins of
trade goods such as clothes, beads, and guns, he is able to determine
probable trade networks, lifestyles, and inter-ethnic group relations.
Furs and Frontiers is organized into three parts, which,
respectively, examine the early fur trade in the Bering Strait region, the
British and Russian rivalry in Northern Alaska, and, finally, the arrival
of foreign vessels and American control. Overall, the book progresses
chronologically, but periods of time do overlap as the book transfers
focus back and forth from British, Russian, and American initiatives in
the region. Additionally, the geographic focus of the work shifts from
Asia, to the Bering Strait region, to inland Alaska, and then back to the
coast as European exploration and trade networks expand. Since a lack
of native sources prevents the narrative from being structured around
indigenous peoples, this organization around foreign nations and re
gions helps to clarify the acting agents in a region with many different
foreign and native ethnic groups.
Bockstoce’s focus on center-periphery relationships and the extent
of native agency also makes Furs and Frontiers a valuable source for the
study of colonialism and the indigenous peoples of the Bering Strait. It
is clear throughout the book that imperial powers struggled to monitor
and control the isolated territory of the Bering Strait. Russian procla
mations of exclusive trade rights and prohibitions on the trade of
alcohol and firearms, for example, were virtually impossible to enforce
(p. 38, 326). Additionally, failure to understand the situation of the
peripheral peoples and regions caused the European powers to con
stantly undersupply trading forts and to rely on the unreasonable
expectation that European technology was inherently adequate to
defend against aggressive natives. Most relevant to postcolonial studies,
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Bockstoce demonstrates that Native Alaskans had extensive preexisting
trade networks, adapted to the intrusion of European trade, actively
understood the fur market, and manipulated European competition.
Moreover, the various explorers’ accounts of interactions with natives,
which ranged from extremely hospitable to hostile, not only illustrates
the variety of native responses to foreigners, but also emphasizes the
need to consider the agency of indigenous people in colonization.
Bockstoce’s analysis of increasingly expanding and complex trade
networks also makes Furs and Frontiers useful for understanding proc
esses of globalization. The global trade networks involved were exten
sive and included exchanges of South American precious metals,
Chinese tea, cotton, and silk, as well as European and American metal
utensils, tools, guns, tobacco, and, among the most important
commodities, alcohol. What's more, financial demands by natives
corresponded to changing Chinese and European fashion, which
consequently altered the value of furs and whalebone.
Furs and Frontiers also illustrates the level of multinational
involvement in the expansion of trade. For instance, Russians
frequently hired Danish, English, and Chukchi explorers and, in the
1850s, whaling ships came to the region from around the world.
Additionally, the Bering Strait developed its own trading language,
which, as Bockstoce notes, combined “English, Hawaiian, Spanish,
Dutch, and other languages” (p. 333). Further demonstrating the
effects of global trade were the technological adaptations of the natives,
including torsion-spring traps, guns, and even the purchasing of foreign
whaling ships. Bockstoce thus demonstrates that even in this relatively
isolated region, global trade networks were well established by the
twentieth century.
Overall, Bockstoce clearly details the development of the fur trade
in the Bering Strait region and effectively conveys both his fascination
with the region’s inhabitants and his devotion to its history. However,
although Bockstoce’s work is thoroughly researched, the introduction
and conclusion feel somewhat inadequate for such a pioneering work. If
there is one area in which Furs and Frontiers could be improved,
therefore, it would be a more explicit discussion of the implications and
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importance of the fur trade to world history. Despite this glaring lack of
a satisfying contextualization, Bockstoce’s monograph provides muchneeded insight into a region previously neglected.
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ALICE GARNER .

A Shifting Shore: Locals, Outsiders, and the
Transformation of a French Fishing Town, 1823-2000. ITHACA, NY:
CORNELL UNIVER SITY PRESS, 2005. 286 PAGES.
Reviewed by Barbara Healy Stickel
In A Shifting Shore: Locals, Outsiders, and the Transformation of a
French Fishing Town, 1823-2000, Alice Garner traces the transforma
tion of a simple French fishing village into a popular resort destination.
Intrigued by the realization that the beachside resorts she frequented
often capitalized on their past as “fishing communities” and utilized
fishing “paraphernalia” for décor, Garner set out to determine “when
and how this romanticization had begun, and what it was like for the
people pictured to become the object of a tourist’s fascination” (p. 6).
According to Garner, A Shifting Shore “required a familiarity with
a broad body of literature, including geography and spatial theory, car
tography, maritime history, fine arts, French literature, anthropology,
sociology (incorporating leisure and tourism theory), architecture,
planning, and the history of medicine” (p. 7). Accordingly, her bibliog
raphy reflects careful research—a fact that allows Garner’s discussion of
various attempts to tame the marshes and other tidal areas by
developers interested in exploiting the region to vividly demonstrate
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how such transformation occurred. In doing so, she repeatedly
demonstrates how, when the ultimate goal of resort building was
financial reward for a select few and the entertainment, pleasure, and
health of the elite, local interests and knowledge were rarely considered.
Garner also discusses the evolution of “bathing” in the sea—for
both recreational and health purposes—pointing out that the existing
“unregulated bathing habits of coast-dwellers” were ignored as the
“great families” and other resort-going elite imposed a “new” practice of
holidaying and sea bathing based on strict rules of etiquette. This early
nineteenth century shift was the first step in displacing the fishing
community from its traditional locale.
Surprisingly, while coastal inhabitants were described as an uncivi
lized, savage, and even moronic, people residing in an “exotic” locale,
they were also regularly identified as a “must-see” attraction and
considered one of the area’s major tourist attractions. Garner demon
strates the objectification of fisherfolk by pointing out that tourists felt
free to “engage, ask questions, take a deep breath, and enter their living
quarters,” as though fisherfolk existed solely for their personal enter
tainment. When it became apparent that tourists were not content to
be mere “spectators,” cooperative fishermen were located and resort
hotels began furnishing appropriate attire so that their guests could
“help” with mostly-simulated fishing experiences.
Also interesting is Garner’s discussion of the ongoing battle
between fishermen and resorts over the use of the beaches.
Traditionally, fishermen would dry their nets and mend gear on the
beaches. Although tourists loved to watch them work, the increasing
numbers of tourists and eroding beaches increased competition for the
beachfront—fishermen were confined to certain areas and were
eventually “squeezed out” altogether.
While A Shifting Shore does document how the fishing village was
transformed into a resort community, it does have its shortcomings.
Garner explains how the development of jetties and promenades were
intended to accommodate pleasure boating and beachgoers, for
example, but she neglects to sufficiently explain how this change would
have impacted the local fishing community—a long sea wall, after all,
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would effectively block artisanal fishermen from the beach, thus pro
hibiting them from beaching their vessels. Additionally, while she does
makes a brief mention of how moorage was to be offered for some ves
sels, she neglects to explain that this “improvement” could create
difficulties for the fishermen, who would undoubtedly be expected to
pay rent for a spot to keep their boat.
Furthermore, although Garner’s use of photographs and postcards
from the period helps readers visualize the transformation, her pre
sumption that the various photographs of working fisherfolk were
staged is probably correct, which takes away from their historic value. In
reality, these images only demonstrate that certain members of the dis
placed fishing community were willing to pose for cameras, most likely
for a fee. She also fails to mention that at the same time their physical
locations were being usurped, most fisherfolk were likely struggling to
survive the increased cost of living associated with the emergence of a
resort community. Moreover, the influx of an economic elite into the
community would also be likely to have consequences for fishing
families, as their children came into contact with wealthier, more
privileged children, and began to desire goods and opportunities
previously unknown to them.
Finally, while Garner has written an interesting book that demon
strates how the lands around the fishing community were usurped by
development and transformed to benefit tourism, she does not follow
through with the second part of her thesis concerning the impacts of
this transference on the fisherfolk. In her “Acknowledgements,” she
does thank one individual for facilitating “interviews with elderly fish
ermen who were usually wary of journalist types.” However, the
bibliography lists no individuals as sources—no fishermen are identified
in the text and Garner does not reference any interviews with existing
fishermen concerning “what it was like…to become the object of
tourist’s fascination” (p. 6).
The most remarkable thing about this book, however, is how the
story can be applied to any fishing community, to any littoral commu
nity, and, for that matter, any place in the developed world. It is
unfathomable for most Californians to imagine life without “the
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beach,” but the oldest homes found in coastal communities are not
vacation homes, but fishermen’s shacks, sheltered from the sea.
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The Forum welcomes submissions from currently enrolled or recently
graduated students from all accredited colleges and universities.
Submissions must be historical in nature and should be sent
electronically to calpolyforum@gmail.com in accordance with the
stated requirement and procedures available on our website:
http://calpolyforum.wordpress.com. The following summary explains
our policies but should not be considered exhaustive.
Editorial Procedure: All submissions to The Forum are read and
evaluated by a panel of three editors using a double-blind review system.
All final decisions rest with the executive editor(s) and the faculty
advisor based upon the needs of the journal. The editors may request
revisions and, where appropriate, reserve the right to make adjustments
to the text.
Style: Excluding book reviews, all submissions should follow the
Chicago Manual of Style (Turabian) and cite all sources using footnotes.
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Book Reviews should use parenthetical citations, for example: (p. 64).
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